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Beyond Sexual Humanitarianism:  
A Postcolonial Approach to  
Anti-Trafficking Law 
Prabha Kotiswaran* 
This Article examines from a postcolonial perspective a deep paradox in contemporary 
anti-trafficking law and discourse. The inordinate attention on trafficking in Western 
industrialized economies is disproportionate to the extent of the problem. Only 7% of the world’s 
20.9 million forced laborers are in developed economies and the EU while 56% are in Asia 
Pacific. Yet in BRIC countries like India with a substantial majority of the world’s trafficked 
victims and where 90% of all trafficking is domestic, trafficking has little policy resonance. 
Trafficking was only recently criminalized as part of India’s extensive rape law reforms. India, 
however, remains an active site for sexual humanitarianism as American evangelical groups and 
local police dramatically raid and rescue ‘female sex slaves’ from gritty big-city brothels. As 
developing countries increasingly shape international anti-trafficking law and policy, this Article 
proposes two ways whereby the postcolony could be far more than a site of sexual 
humanitarianism. First, I offer India’s bonded, contract and migrant labor laws as a robust 
labor law model against trafficking that could inform international legal developments. This is in 
contrast to the criminal justice model propagated by the UN Trafficking Protocol worldwide. 
Second, through a case study of Indian sex workers’ mobilization against trafficking through self-
regulatory boards in a red-light area, I show how sex workers are not simply passive victims and 
that community-based initiatives that make sparing use of criminal law could prove more effective 
than conventional anti-trafficking strategies.  
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The third world sex worker enslaved in a big-city brothel has captured the 
imagination of many a crusader in the contemporary battle against human 
trafficking for sex work or “modern slavery.” Developing countries figure 
prominently in this landscape of sexual humanitarianism1 during a period that 
some scholars label as fostering a global sex panic.2 Journalists like Nicholas 
Kristof of the New York Times have published over forty-six op-eds in recent 
years on the subject of “sex trafficking.”3 An indefatigable opponent of sex 
slavery, Kristof has gone so far as to purchase the freedom of sex workers from 
the brothels of third world countries, content that such sex workers found an 
alternate livelihood in running small shops of trinkets for tourists.4 In 2011, he 
reported on his undercover raids along with a U.S. abolitionist5 organization, the 
 
1. This term is coined by Nicola Mai. See Nick Mai, Between Embodied Cosmopolitanism and Sexual 
Humanitarianism, in BORDERS, MOBILITIES AND MIGRATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE 
MEDITERRANEAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY 175, 176–77 (Lisa Anteby-Yemini et al. eds., 2014). 
2. See generally JO DOEZEMA, SEX SLAVES AND DISCOURSE MASTERS 124–27 (2010); Ronald 
Weitzer, Moral Crusade Against Prostitution, SOCIETY, Mar.–Apr. 2006, 33, 33–38. 
3. This term is used to connote trafficking for the purposes of sex work. This terminology is 
not without problem; I will allude to the stakes in the terminology used to describe trafficking later in 
this Article.  
4. See NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, HALF THE SKY: HOW TO CHANGE THE 
WORLD, at xviii–xix (2010); Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Leaving the Brothel Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 2005, at A19. 
5. Many opponents of sex work invoke antislavery discourse to advocate for eliminating sex 
work altogether irrespective of the conditions under which women perform it. They have 
appropriated this term to invoke the moral charge of the term “slavery” to propose a neo-abolitionist 
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International Justice Mission, in Sonagachi, Kolkata’s largest red-light area. There 
he claimed to have “transformed” the lives of five girls, two of whom were hours 
away from their first rape, part of a series of rapes.6 Kristof’s very insistence on a 
series of conflations between trafficking, trafficking for sex work, sex work and 
what he calls modern-day slavery in the developing world, and the moral urgency 
and raid and rescue strategies which sustain them, are paradigmatic of the state of 
most anti-trafficking interventions today. Journalists are not the only ones 
engaging in sexual humanitarianism. Gloria Steinem called on Indian policymakers 
to criminalize customers of sex workers.7 Indian activists themselves also actively 
participate in cultivating this imagery of Indian women’s victimhood and are key 
transnational players in their own right. In 2013, Sunitha Krishnan, the founder of 
an abolitionist Indian nongovernmental organization (NGO), Prajwala, traveled to 
New York to receive a lifetime achievement award from the New York based 
Diller-von Furstenberg Family Foundation for her work against “sex trafficking.”8 
Many postcolonial scholars have powerfully countered this abolitionist 
discourse by forefronting the agency of third world actors, especially sex workers.9 
This Article adds significantly to this critique by going beyond the assumption that 
developing countries are simply the fields on which deeply ideological positions 
over women’s sexuality gets played out or are sources of migrant labor most likely 
to be affected by trafficking, which, according to international law, involves the 
recruitment or transportation of a person under threat of coercion for purposes of 
a variety of exploitative practices.10 Instead, I consider the domestic legal response 
 
position against prostitution by analogizing it to modern day slavery. See Janet Halley et al., From the 
International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four 
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 338–39 n.7 (2006). 
6. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Raiding a Brothel in India, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at 
A35. 
7. See Prostitution Is Commercial Rape, Says Gloria Steinem, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS (Jan. 29, 
2014, 19:43 IST), http://www.financialexpress.com/news/prostitution-is-commercial-rape-says-
gloria-steinem/1221602. 
8. See Accolades, PRAJWALA, http://www.prajwalaindia.com/accolades.html. 
9. See RATNA KAPUR, EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS OF 
POSTCOLONIALISM 128–34 (2005); Kamala Kempadoo, Introduction to TRAFFICKING AND 
PROSTITUTION RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION, SEX WORK, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, at vii, xxviii–xxx (Kamala Kempadoo et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012). 
10. Although a social problem of considerable vintage, trafficking as a contemporary 
international problem has spilled over into the popular consciousness and assumed its potent charge 
only in the past decade. Given the scale of the problem of trafficking, hundreds of millions of dollars 
are spent annually on dealing with it. For instance, between 2001 and 2007, the U.S. government 
alone spent $447 million in foreign assistance to NGOs, international organizations, and foreign 
governments. Gergana Danailova-Trainor & Frank Laczko, Trafficking in Persons and Development: 
Towards Greater Policy Coherence, 48 INT’L MIGRATION 38, 58 (2010). Some estimates suggest that 1.3 
million people are trafficked worldwide, including those trafficked domestically. Id. at 57. The U.N. 
Population Fund estimates that between 700,000 and two million women are trafficked across 
international borders annually, and when internal trafficking is included, the number increases to four 
million. Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human 
Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2982 n.13 (2006). The U.S. government estimates that 600,000 
to 800,000 persons are trafficked across international borders annually. Elizabeth M. Wheaton et al., 
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to the problem of internal trafficking in one developing world context, namely 
India, with a view to substantively informing how we might conceptualize the 
contours of anti-trafficking law more broadly. I suggest that as the U.N. Protocol 
continues its diffusion internationally, such an exercise will become increasingly 
essential to a theory of anti-trafficking law that aspires to go beyond sexual 
humanitarianism. 
I. THE CONTEMPORARY ANTI-TRAFFICKING DISCOURSE 
A. Anti-Trafficking Discourse: Need for a View from the Developing World 
So how did we get to a situation where a Facebook game inspired by 
Kristof’s book Half the Sky today raises public awareness on child prostitution and 
female genital mutilation?11 As documented extensively, almost ten years ago, 
 
Economics of Human Trafficking, 48 INT’L MIGRATION 114, 118 (2010). It further estimates that 80% of 
trafficked individuals are women and girls and 50% are minors. Id. Meanwhile, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that the number of people working in forced labor due to 
trafficking is 2.45 million while there are 9.8 to 14.8 million people working as forced laborers. See 
Jacqueline Berman, The Left, the Right, and the Prostitute: The Making of U.S. Antitrafficking in Persons Policy, 
14 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 269, 284 (2006). The ILO projects that 43% of those trafficked for 
forced labor are forced into commercial sexual exploitation while only 11% of those in forced labor 
are in commercial sexual exploitation. Id. The U.S. Department of State once estimated that 50,000 
women and children are trafficked into the United States each year, but current estimates have scaled 
the numbers down to a figure of between 14,500 and 17,500 victims. Denise Brennan, Key Issues in the 
Resettlement of Formerly Trafficked Persons in the United States, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1581, 1589 n.25 (2010). 
Yet the meager use of the T-visas so far further puts these figures into question. See id. at 1589. For 
rejections of the data surrounding trafficking, see David A. Feingold, Trafficking in Numbers: The Social 
Construction of Human Trafficking Data, in SEX, DRUGS AND BODY COUNTS: THE POLITICS OF 
NUMBERS IN GLOBAL CRIME AND CONFLICT 47 (Peter Andreas & Kelly M. Greenhill eds., 2010) 
(characterizing the trafficking field as “one of numerical uncertainty and statistical doubt”); Ernesto 
U. Savona & Sonia Stefanizzi, Introduction to MEASURING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 2, 2 (Ernesto U. 
Savona & Sonia Stefanizzi eds., 2007) (compiling essays showing that available information on 
trafficking is “fragmentary, heterogeneous, difficult to acquire, uncorrelated and often outdated”). A 
report released in August 2010 by the British Association of Chief Police Officers similarly reported 
finding 2,600 women out of a total of 30,000 sex workers from the off-street prostitution sector being 
trafficked for sex work. KEITH JACKSON ET AL., SETTING THE RECORD: THE TRAFFICKING OF 
MIGRANT WOMEN IN THE ENGLAND AND WALES OFF-STREET PROSTITUTION SECTOR 5 (2010), 
available at http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2010/201008critmw01.pdf. Underlying 
these highly varied estimates of the problem of trafficking, however, is the acknowledgment, even by 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the only U.N. entity focusing on the 
criminal justice aspects of trafficking, that the data on the extent of the problem is woefully 
inadequate. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 11–12 (2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf. The UNODC attributes this inadequacy to the lack of 
international standardization of definitions along the lines of the U.N. Protocol, the failure of even 
countries with similar legal systems to count the same things, and countries’ failures to include 
domestic crimes amounting to trafficking within their data. Id. at 11. For a different take on the very 
phenomenon of trafficking as a discrete empirical reality, see DOEZEMA, supra note 2, at 5–15 
(detailing the discursive effects of anti-trafficking rhetoric and the myth of trafficking). 
11. Elizabeth Jensen, A Game Aims to Draw Attention to Women’s Issues, N.Y. TIMES, February 
18, 2013, at B5. 
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governance feminists12 within the Violence Against Women (VAW) movement 
were richly rewarded for their efforts in mainstreaming women’s rights within 
human rights discourse when the U.N. General Assembly adopted the 2000 
United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking Against 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (U.N. Protocol)13 supplementing the 
2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,14 on 
November 15, 2000.15 The negotiations leading up to the Protocol and its 
immediate aftermath were characterized by an ideologically charged debate over 
what constitutes trafficking, especially in relation to prostitution. The U.S. 
legislature, meanwhile, passed the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act, 2000 (VTVPA).16 Given the dominance of the United States in the 
international arena, the negotiation of the U.N. Protocol reflected largely 
American feminist debates on sex work, prostitution, and trafficking.17 
Compromises were brokered between abolitionist feminists on the one hand, and 
human rights activists (along with some sex worker advocates) on the other. Both 
camps cautiously welcomed the final Protocol as a success for their advocacy 
efforts.18 
Even as the U.N. Protocol rapidly found signatories, it resulted in a 
substantial reallocation of state resources and punitive powers. A global panic 
around sex work and trafficking, fostered largely by U.S. foreign policy and 
indirectly through the naming and shaming techniques of U.S. anti-trafficking law, 
led to the constant conflation of trafficking with trafficking for sex work and of 
trafficking for sex work with sex work. Sex work was and continues to be 
presented, particularly by abolitionist feminists, not only as exploitative per se, but 
also as the most horrific form of modern-day slavery. Further, the initiative of 
radical feminists in speaking about women as uniquely harmed by sex morphed 
 
12. Janet Halley has explained the concept of governance feminism (GF): 
GF is, I think, an underrecognized but important fact of governance more generally in the 
early twenty-first century. I mean the term to refer to the incremental but by now quite 
noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power. It 
takes many forms, and some parts of feminism participate more effectively than others; 
some are not players at all. Feminists by no means have won everything they want—far 
from it—but neither are they helpless outsiders. Rather, as feminist legal activism comes of 
age, it accedes to a newly mature engagement with power. 
Halley et al., supra note 5, at 340. 
13. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 60, U.N. Doc A/55/49 (Dec. 23, 2000). 
14. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 
T.I.A.S. No. 13, 127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. 
15. For an elaboration of the relationship between the international treatment of sex 
trafficking and the international violence against women movement and human rights movement, see 
KAPUR, supra note 9, at 95; Halley et al., supra note 5, at 352. 
16. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, § 106, 
114 Stat. 1464, 1474 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7104 (2012)). 
17. Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-
Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1658 (2010). 
18. For a delineation of these feminist positions, see PRABHA KOTISWARAN, DANGEROUS 
SEX, INVISIBLE LABOR: SEX WORK AND THE LAW IN INDIA 67–156 (2011). 
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into a primary concern of the U.S. government and the Christian Right 
internationally.19 The emergence of a neoliberal sexual agenda meant that social 
problems are located in deviant individuals rather than mainstream institutions 
thus necessitating criminal justice interventions rather than redistributive reforms 
from the welfare state.20 The abolitionist framing of trafficking as involving 
women and girls forced into sexual slavery by social deviants21 has deflected 
attention from the migration patterns of low-income women and men who 
undertake risky migration for work in exploitative informal employment.22 
Consequently, the implementation of anti-trafficking law by many countries has 
been both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive because it targets 
women engaged in voluntary sex work. It is underinclusive because trafficking for 
purposes other than sex work is effectively ignored and rendered less worthy of 
our attention. As such unintended consequences of feminist advocacy mount, 
feminists in the human rights movement have conceded the errors of their 
strategies.23 Whether unwittingly or otherwise, it is now apparent that having let 
the genie out of the bottle, feminists are struggling to prevent issues of women’s 
violence from being used to stage disputes between states such as border control, 
immigration, and the negative externalities of globalization even as conservative 
domestic alliances are consolidated. Thus, in the several years since the U.N. 
Protocol came into force, despite efforts to legislate against trafficking 
internationally, regionally, and domestically, anti-trafficking law seems to have set 
itself up for failure. 
Indeed, human rights scholars like James Hathaway have questioned why the 
“pluralist nongovernmental voices around the international negotiating table were 
so preoccupied by internecine conflict with the abolitionists over the legitimacy of 
sex work” to the neglect of “serious negative human rights externalities” built into 
the trafficking and migrant smuggling protocols.24 Feminists like Janie Chuang and 
Anne Gallagher have defended their positions in the Protocol negotiations by 
elaborating on the range of nonabolitionist perspectives at the negotiations and 
how human rights activists did their best to support the human rights of sex 
workers especially against state abuse.25 Yet, they “became embroiled in [the] 
 
19. See Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women, and Human Rights: Women Make 
Demands and Ladies Get Protection, 7 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 17, 36 (2004). 
20. See Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the “New Abolitionism,” 18 DIFFERENCES: J. 
FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 128, 137 (2007). 
21. Chuang, supra note 17, at 1658. 
22. Id. at 1659. 
23. See Miller, supra note 19, at 36–37. 
24. James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 
46 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
25. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1672–77; Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights and Human 
Trafficking: Quagmire or Firm Ground? A Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789, 789–91 
(2009). 
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highly divisive battles” over prostitution reform26 while being forced to “defend[] 
against partisan attacks.”27 
One has to be cognizant of the constrained circumstances under which 
human rights and sex workers’ groups functioned during the U.N. Protocol 
negotiations, which Gallagher has alluded to in recent writing.28 Indeed, it is no 
small feat to have fundamentally shifted states’ attitudes toward trafficking, which 
they viewed as involving “bad people,” to seeing it as a human rights problem, 
which affects not just women and children in prostitution.29 Moreover, advocates 
were negotiating what was essentially a crime control treaty in the context of the 
U.N. Crime Commission’s division of the issues of trafficking and migration into 
two different protocols whereby trafficking was understood as nonconsensual and 
smuggling as consensual. Interestingly, even as some feminists continue to occupy 
and navigate the ideological fallout of the U.N. Protocol and the VTVPA,30 others 
have assumed a more pragmatic stance towards these legal frameworks, which are 
here to stay and have therefore set about assessing how they can be made more 
effective.31 
I suggest that although we cannot unwind what is essentially the criminal law 
architecture of the U.N. Protocol, and its diffusion of the U.N. Protocol 
worldwide,32 its definitional ambivalence presents us with an interesting 
opportunity for intervention. International organizations such as the U.N. Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the guardian of the Protocol, and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) are returning to the drawing board once 
again to identify core aspects of the definition of trafficking under Article 3 of the 
U.N. Protocol. After all, the Open-ended Interim Working Group on the U.N. 
Protocol has observed that “important concepts contained in the Protocol are not 
clearly understood and, therefore, are not being consistently implemented and 
applied.”33 Not surprisingly then, the UNODC has recently admitted its lack of 
 
26. Chuang, supra note 17, at 1672. 
27. Id. 
28. See Gallagher, supra note 25, at 789–91. 
29. See id. at 825–26. 
30. See PARDIS MAHDAVI, GRIDLOCK: LABOR, MIGRATION, AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN 
DUBAI 18, 27 (2011); RHACEL SALAZAR PARREÑAS, ILLICIT FLIRTATIONS: LABOR, MIGRATION 
AND SEX TRAFFICKING IN TOKYO 51–55 (2011). 
31. See Janie A. Chuang, Achieving Accountability for Migrant Domestic Worker Abuse, 88 N.C. L. 
REV. 1627, 1639–41, 1649–56 (2010); Anne T. Gallagher, Improving the Effectiveness of the International 
Law of Human Trafficking: A Vision for the Future of the US Trafficking in Persons Reports, 12 HUM. RTS. 
REV. 381, 390–97 (2011). 
32. For a rather particularized view of this diffusion process, see generally PAULETTE LLOYD 
ET AL., THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF LAW: TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND THE CASE OF HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING 3–5 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910623 
(using GPS data on road connectivity to argue that criminalization of human trafficking has diffused 
along tangible networks). 
33. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, ISSUE PAPER: ABUSE OF A POSITION 
OF VULNERABILITY AND OTHER “MEANS” WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF TRAFFICKING IN 
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data on the phenomenon of trafficking, the magnitude of the problem, and the 
uneven nature of domestic law reform undertaken to conform to states’ 
obligations under the Trafficking Protocol.34 This has led the UNODC to 
commission three Issue Papers on core concepts central to the definition of 
trafficking under Article 3, namely “the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability,” “consent,” and “exploitation.” Similarly, in 2013, the ILO 
organized a Tripartite Meeting of Experts on Forced Labour and Trafficking for 
Labour Exploitation35 to advise the ILO on whether standard setting was essential 
to supplement the ILO’s forced labor conventions to address trafficking for labor 
exploitation.36 I will refer to their debates over the conceptual inter-relationship 
between forced labor and trafficking in a subsequent section. Given that only 
some of the central concepts in the definition of trafficking are of legal vintage in 
contexts other than trafficking (e.g., consent in rape law, fraud in contract law),37 it 
is clear for the time being that the very parameters of the offence of trafficking 
and its scope38 continue to be up for grabs. 
It is precisely against this backdrop that I suggest taking seriously the 
perspective of developing countries in relation to anti-trafficking law. For one, we 
might recollect that the international legal response to trafficking and its default 
understanding of trafficking for purposes of sex work has a long history, which, 
 
PERSONS 6 (2012), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2012/ 
UNODC_2012_Issue_Paper_-_Abuse_of_a_Position_of_Vulnerability.pdf. 
34. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 6–7. 
35. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INT’L LABOUR ORG., REPORT FOR DISCUSSION AT THE 
TRIPARTITE MEETING OF EXPERTS CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE ADOPTION OF AN ILO INSTRU-




37. For a discussion of concepts central to rape law such as consent and coercion, see 
RETHINKING RAPE LAW INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 17–29 (Clare 
McGlynn & Vanessa Munro eds., 2010). For a dizzying array of ways in which the definition of 
trafficking is incorporated in the domestic legal jurisdictions of several countries, see UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 30–75. The paper categorizes countries into 
those whose domestic laws conform to the U.N. Protocol definition, those that contain fewer means 
than listed in the Protocol, those that do away with the means of trafficking, and those whose legal 
situation is unclear. See id. at 30. 
38. Human rights lawyers further observe that despite the passage of the trafficking and 
migrant smuggling protocols, fundamental questions linger as to what trafficking is about, how it 
differs from migrant smuggling, how it relates to the criminalization of irregular migrants, whether 
asylum seekers can be smuggled or trafficked and whether trafficking and migrant smuggling should 
be treated as a human rights issue or an international criminal justice issue. See Anne Gallagher, 
Human Rights and the New U.N. Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 
HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 977 (2001). Bridget Anderson alludes to early commentators who viewed the 
failure of the two Protocols to provide any guidance on identification to be a significant and 
deliberate weakness. Bridget Anderson, Motherhood, Apple Pie and Slavery: Reflections on the Trafficking 
Debates 4 (Ctr. on Migration, Policy and Soc’y, Working Paper No. 48, 2007), available at 
http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/working_papers/WP_2007/Bridget%20
Anderson%20WP0748.pdf. 
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amongst other things, was negotiated and operationalized in the colonies of 
several Western countries.39 Thus, the U.N. Protocol is the latest initiative in this 
long history of anti-trafficking law. Second, to the extent that the U.N. Protocol 
has been used as an instrument of border control by developed countries against 
migrants from developing countries, the voice of developing countries in 
reorienting trafficking in terms of a problem of labor migration has been limited. 
Many scholars have underlined the significance of immigration law reform and 
labor law reform in host states to strengthen the bargaining potential of migrant 
workers, especially undocumented workers. The International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of 
1990 seeks precisely to do this, but has only forty-six parties to date who are 
essentially states of origin. On the other hand, to the extent that the U.N. Protocol 
on Trafficking has been exceptionally popular with developed countries,40 
creatively redrawing the legal lines around the definition of trafficking may well 
benefit migrant workers. 
Indications are that developing countries are increasingly playing a significant 
role in reimagining anti-trafficking law. In a major development that holds much 
promise, the Governing Body of the ILO placed the issue of supplementing the 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) on the agenda of the 103rd session of 
the International Labour Conference.41 Significantly, developing countries, 
particularly Brazil, played an important role in the discussions based on which the 
expert committee report recommended standard setting to the Governing Body.42 
Brazil’s role in this context and its ability to generate best practices against 
trafficking over the years is hardly surprising given the sheer magnitude of the 
phenomenon of trafficking in developing countries, particularly the emerging 
economies. For instance, according to the ILO, forced labor, one of the forms of 
exploitation listed in Article 3, is to be found largely in Asia and the Pacific. Thus, 
in 2005, of the 8.1 million victims of forced labor (excluding sex work) the world 
over, nearly 6.2 million were in the Asia-Pacific region while the industrialized 
 
39. See ASHWINI TAMBE, CODES OF MISCONDUCT: REGULATING PROSTITUTION IN LATE 
COLONIAL BOMBAY 69 (2009) (describing how the League of Nations took on trafficking in women 
and children in 1920 as part of its mandate, necessitating reporting by thirty-three countries to the 
League of Nations). 
40. By all means, the diffusion of the U.N. Protocol has been a rapid process. According to 
the UNODC, the Protocol has had a huge push effect on countries’ formulation of anti-trafficking 
law. Between 2003 and 2008, the number of countries with a specific offence of trafficking in persons 
doubled. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 8. Similarly, the number 
of countries with national action plans on trafficking exploded from 5% to 53% between 2003 and 
2008. Id. at 25. 
41. Int’l Labour Org., Decision on the Second Item on the Agenda: Agenda of the International Labour 
Conference, INT’L LAB. ORG. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.ilo.org/gb/decisions/GB317-
decision/WCMS_208157/lang--en/index.htm. 
42. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INT’L LABOUR ORG., REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE 
TRIPARTITE MEETING OF EXPERTS ON FORCED LABOUR AND TRAFFICKING FOR LABOUR 
EXPLOITATION ¶¶ 92–102 (2013), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed 
_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_207218.pdf. 
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economies had only 113,000 victims of forced labor. Similarly, one million of 
these victims of forced labor were trafficked into it, of which 408,968 were 
trafficked in the Asia-Pacific region and 74,113 in the industrialized economies. 
Let us consider another form of exploitation covered by Article 3 of the U.N. 
Protocol, namely, practices similar to slavery, which include debt bondage. Here, 
roughly 84 to 88% of the world’s 20.5 million bonded laborers are to be found in 
South Asia.43 
Further, although trafficking is usually thought of as a cross-border 
phenomenon, in emerging economies such as Brazil, India, China, and Russia, 
much of the trafficking is domestic. Thus, reportedly 90% of all trafficking in 
India is domestic.44 Indeed, it is the very visibility of long-standing labor problems 
in the context of the ratification and enforcement of the U.N. Protocol that has 
caused these emerging economies to adopt particularistic interpretations of 
trafficking in their criminal law as trafficking for sex work rather than for labor 
exploitation.45 Notwithstanding such a reaction, to the extent that internal 
migration, and therefore trafficking, has traditionally been a major problem to 
which countries like India have responded, domestic legal responses to trafficking 
could well inform the ongoing operationalization of the U.N. Protocol. Domestic 
anti-trafficking law may also prove instructive in rethinking the enforcement 
mechanism for anti-trafficking law, with a predominant role for labor law over 
criminal law in targeting what is essentially a labor migration issue. In the intensely 
transnational setting of anti-trafficking law, this “feedback loop” from the 
domestic back to the international could well provide valuable insights. 
In the rest of Part I, I will elaborate on the conceptual conundrums of the 
definition of trafficking in Article 3 of the U.N. Protocol. To the extent that much 
contemporary anti-trafficking law and its underlying discourse both produce and 
are in turn constituted by the global sex panic, the quest for an alternate legal 
imagination takes me to a domestic legal jurisdiction operating in “ordinary 
times.” With the understanding that trafficking as a social problem has long pre-
dated recent international law reform efforts, in Part II, I locate my critique in 
India, focusing particularly on the interlude between two moments of intense 
legislative activity around trafficking for sex work in the 1920s and in the past 
decade. Specifically, I examine how three social legislations of the 1970s, as 
interpreted by the Indian Supreme Court in the 1980s, targeted social practices of 
forced migration and labor, which we would today construe as trafficking. By 
 
43. SIDDHARTH KARA, BONDED LABOR TACKLING THE SYSTEM OF SLAVERY IN SOUTH 
ASIA 3 (2012). 
44. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 184 (2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192595.pdf (third of seven PDFs comprising the 
report; all other PDFs available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/index.htm). 
45. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 42, ¶ 120. Interestingly, trafficking is defined in 
these jurisdictions as referring to trafficking only for sexual exploitation rather than labor exploitation. 
For my discussion of the Indian context, see infra Part II. 
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delineating how these laws construed concepts central to the trafficking debates—
namely, coercion, consent, and exploitation—in the context of the trafficking of 
men for labor, I de-exceptionalize trafficking as always implying trafficking for sex 
work. I then extend my discussion to exploitation, which is central to the alternate 
legal imaginary as well as to the U.N. Protocol. I de-exceptionalize the 
understanding amongst abolitionists of all sex work as amounting to trafficking by 
theorizing exploitation in the context of the political economy of sex work in 
India. Thus, I view the agency of third world sex workers as embedded in 
concrete institutional structures by delineating the variances in levels of 
exploitation within the sex industry. 
I note here the tremendous disconnect between legal scholarship on human 
trafficking on the one hand, and labor and migration studies on the other. Labor 
and migration scholars continually delineate patterns of exploitation in labor 
markets barely ever using the term trafficking. Legal scholars, meanwhile, are keen 
to identify discrete instances of trafficking, but are somewhat frustrated with the 
unwillingness of labor scholars to draw relatively clear boundaries between 
trafficking and just “bad work,” which is amplified by the latter’s metaphorical use 
of the term exploitation. Legal ethnographers, I suggest, are well equipped to 
bridge this gap given their constant engagement with legal concepts used by 
lawyers, their empirical lives, and the translation back into renewed conceptual 
understandings. In the process, the interface between the law and economy is also 
revealed, especially the precise interaction between social norms driven by the 
economic logic of the market and the criminal law such that it becomes possible 
to predict the counterintuitive economic consequences of anti-trafficking 
regulatory options. 
Finally, having examined labor law’s alternate regulatory framework for 
dealing with trafficking, I switch gears to contemplate the chronic enforcement 
gap that it entails. The enforcement of anti-trafficking law is impeded by problems 
of misrecognition of survivors of trafficking and competing prerogatives (e.g., 
between trafficking and border control). In developing countries, poor 
institutional resources pose an additional problem. Hence, I examine community-
based attempts to address trafficking. This involves sex workers, a constituency 
mostly invisible, but also occasionally villainized, in anti-trafficking discourse. 
Based on my advocacy work for an Indian sex workers’ organization in Kolkata 
over the past several years as well as field work in the city’s biggest red-light area, I 
examine the role of sex workers themselves in combating trafficking through the 
constitution of self-regulatory boards. While this community-based initiative is 
unique given the highly spatialized concentration of brothels in red-light areas like 
Sonagachi, it generally points to the need for the active involvement of workers 
themselves in addressing trafficking within their respective labor markets. 
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B. Ten Years of the U.N. Trafficking Protocol—The Prevailing Common Sense  
(Or the Unfolding of Collateral and Intended 46 Damage) 
1. The Conceptual Scaffolding of Anti-Trafficking Law 
In this section, I will highlight some conceptual dynamics that animate anti-
trafficking law and discourse so as to assess their interrelation and real-life effects. 
In particular, I will explore the dynamics between coercion/consent, 
legality/illegality, and exploitation. For this, consider the conceptual bare bones of 
the definition of trafficking in the U.N. Protocol. We can, for ease of use, 
disaggregate the definition in terms of the mode of or action required for trafficking 
(recruitment, transportation, transfer etc.), the means by which it is obtained (threat 
or use of force or other forms of coercion etc.) and the purpose for which it is 
obtained, namely, exploitation. In the case of people aged eighteen and over, all 
three elements must be involved for a case to be considered one of trafficking.47 
The definition of trafficking in the U.N. Protocol reads as follows: 
Art. 3. (a): “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; (b): The consent of a victim 
of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in 
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means 
set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used.48 
The issue of consent was central to the negotiations of the U.N. Protocol, and 
was extraordinarily influenced by the sex work debates.49 The radical feminist, 
abolitionist camp wanted prostitution listed as an end purpose for which 
recruitment or transportation would automatically amount to trafficking even if it 
was with the woman’s consent. In other words, they demanded that the purpose 
for which the means are used result in a finding of trafficking, irrespective of the 
 
46. At least one feminist lawyer who was a key player in the negotiations of the U.N. Protocol 
mentioned how what had appeared to be collateral damage now appears to be “intended” on the part 
of states that use anti-trafficking initiatives as a means to control migration and sex work. 
47. Mike Dottridge, GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST TRAFFIC IN WOMEN, Introduction to 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
AROUND THE WORLD 1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.gaatw.org/Collateral%20Damage_Final 
/singlefile_CollateralDamagefinal.pdf; Gallagher, supra note 38, at 987. 
48. U.N. GAOR, supra note 13, at 61. 
49. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1672–77. 
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consent of the victim. “‘Individualist’ NGOs”50 on the other hand, wanted to 
carve out the possibility of migrant voluntary sex work by decoupling the means 
of recruitment from the end purpose. The compromise position indeed achieved 
this decoupling with the caveat that the existence of one or more of the stated 
means, such as coercion and deception, operated to render consent to exploitation 
irrelevant.51 When it came to negotiations of the definition of the purpose, 
namely, exploitation, prostitution was once again ambiguously listed as “exploitation 
of the prostitution of others.”52 Yet the travaux préparatoires,53 or preparatory notes, 
to the Protocol made it clear that this inclusion did not compromise states’ 
domestic, legal treatment of prostitution.54 Leaving aside the particularities of the 
sex work debates and stepping back to observe the Protocol’s definition of 
trafficking in its most general terms, we find that all three elements of the 
definition, the “actions,” the “means,” and the “purpose,” are relatively broad and 
open-ended. 
2. Coercion, Consent, Abuse of Position of Vulnerability 
Consider the means element in particular, namely, the “threat or use of force 
or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person.”55 
All the means other than the abuse of position of vulnerability appear to be 
relatively bounded concepts defined with some precision in domestic legal 
systems. Even then, there is “a high level of fluidity between the various ‘means’ 
stipulated in national laws, due, at least in part, to the absence of definitions” in 
the U.N. Protocol itself.56 
The term “abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability” is rather broad, 
which although not defined in the Protocol itself, according to the travaux 
 
50. Halley et al., supra note 5, at 350. 
51. One might of course argue that Explanation II is redundant since forms of exploitation 
such as slavery, forced labor, servitude and so on negate consent. However “sexual exploitation” or 
“the exploitation of the prostitution of others” do not necessarily imply the lack of consent. See U.N. 
GAOR, supra note 13, at 61. 
52. Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, Revised Draft Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.254/4/Add.3/Rev.7 (Jul. 19, 2000). 
53. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to Eleventh Session—Addendum: 
Interpretative Notes for the Official Records (Travaux Préparatoires)  of the Negotiation of the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, U.N. Doc. 
A/55/383/Add.1. (Nov. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime]. 
54. Id. ¶ 64. 
55. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 5 n.1. 
56. Id. at 8. 
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préparatoires,57 it refers to “any situation in which the person involved has no real 
and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.”58 In a world 
economy that is rife with precarious labor, this formulation offers little practical 
direction. Even otherwise, some legal practitioners find the concept “too vague to 
be effectively justiciable.”59 Recently, the ILO in an attempt to identify working 
conditions that violate the ILO Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29) drew the 
line around this concept more narrowly. The ILO’s 2009 Report, The Cost of 
Coercion, illustrates the concept by offering the example of a worker who is 
economically so vulnerable that unless he complies with his employer’s demands, 
he is at risk of losing his job.60 
The Secretariat to the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons61 recently 
prepared a background paper analyzing how this term has been operationalized. A 
general overview of the sources they consider offers a traditional understanding of 
vulnerability as related to one’s status arising from age, gender, pregnancy, 
disability, and only occasionally economic condition.62 This was followed by a 
rather detailed Issue Paper on Abuse of a Position of Vulnerability and Other “Means” 
Within the Definition of Trafficking in Persons, considered by the UNODC Expert 
Group Meeting in June 2012. Significantly, the issue paper found that many states 
construed “abuse of power or a position of vulnerability” in terms of a common 
sense understanding of vulnerability. This permeated notions of disposition to 
trafficking (rather than as a means of trafficking) and was also used to substantiate 
other means of trafficking as well as the purpose of trafficking, namely, 
exploitation.63 The concept was invoked both at the point of substantively proving 
the offence of trafficking and also as a factor in determining penalties for 
trafficking. In all these instances, vulnerability was understood in terms of 
biological attributes (e.g., age, sex, disability), circumstances (e.g., isolation, 
dependency, irregular legal status) or poor economic status. Interestingly, the 
concept seems to have been added to the U.N. Protocol at the last minute, in an 
attempt to resolve differences over how prostitution ought to be dealt with by the 
 
57. Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, supra note 53, ¶ 63. 
58. Id. ¶ 63. 
59. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 9. 
60. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORG., THE COST OF COERCION: 
GLOBAL REPORT UNDER THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK ¶ 35 (2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups 
/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_106230.pdf. 
61. Secretariat to the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons, Analysis of Key Concepts: 
Focus on the Concept of “Abuse of Power or of a Position of Vulnerability” in Article 3 of the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, ¶ 4, U.N. 
Doc. CTOC/COP/WG.4/2011/3 (Aug. 4, 2011). 
62. See id. ¶¶ 14–34. 
63. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 8. 
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U.N. Protocol.64 Indeed, the Swiss courts have interpreted voluntary sex work by 
foreign migrant women as necessarily devoid of consent given their presumed 
vulnerability.65 The ideological differences between abolitionist feminists and sex 
work advocates have clearly left a lasting legacy. To add to existing complexities, 
states also interpret the relation between the means in the U.N. Protocol in rather 
varied ways. Sometimes, the abuse of position of vulnerability is juxtaposed to the 
other means of trafficking as involving subtle manipulation rather than force. At 
other times, it is viewed as indicative of coercion, and yet on other occasions, as 
equivalent to coercion.66 
3. Exploitation 
Similarly, let us consider the purpose of trafficking under the U.N. Protocol, 
namely, exploitation, which received a lot less attention in the Protocol 
negotiations when compared to the means. The U.N. Protocol defines exploitation 
to include the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude, or the removal of organs. It is thus not an exhaustive definition.67 None 
of these listed terms connoting exploitation is defined in the U.N. Protocol. The 
term “exploitation of the prostitution of others” is referred to in the 1949 U.N. 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation 
of the Prostitution of Others (1949 Convention).68 There is no definition of the 
term “sexual exploitation” in international law, and it was left undefined in the 
Protocol due to disagreement between countries on what it includes.69 Pointing to 
the exceptionalist legal treatment of prostitution, Miller notes that only 
prostitution is described as an activity as opposed to other listed forms of 
exploitation where a threshold for exploitation is specified.70 
There are definitions of the terms forced labor, slavery, practices similar to 
slavery, and servitude under international law. The ILO Convention No. 29 
concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (1930) defines forced labor as “all work 
 
64. See id. at 22. 
65. Id. at 67. 
66. See id. at 36, 41. 
67. A United Nations report in fact suggests that it is a minimalist definition allowing for 
region-specific forms of trafficking to be included and lists such “other forms of trafficking” such as 
begging, illegal adoptions, and forced marriages. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 35 (2012), available at http://www.unodc.org/ 
documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/Trafficking_in_Persons_2012_web.pdf. 
68. United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271. 
69. Miller, supra note 19, at 32. Although the 2012 United Nations Global Report on Trafficking in 
Persons does not define sexual exploitation, it encompasses “obtaining economic profit from the 
forced commercial sexual activity of another person: the exploitation of the prostitution of others.” It 
also includes cases that may be defined as sex slavery, although Member States have reported very few 
such cases. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 67, at 34. 
70. See Miller, supra note 19, at 32. 
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or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and 
for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”71 Penalty is 
interpreted as involving a legal or economic sanction, or the application of 
physical or psychological force.72 The ILO specifically clarifies that forced labor 
cannot be equated with low wages or poor working conditions, or situations of 
pure economic necessity where a worker feels “unable to leave a job because of 
the real or perceived absence of employment alternatives.”73 The ILO has been 
recently engaged in revisiting the forced labor Convention to assess the need for 
additional standard setting. After all, the Convention was adopted at a time when 
governments were the principal users of forced labor,74 while 90% of forced 
laborers are today exploited by private actors. In this context, the tripartite group 
of experts who looked into the Convention in detail themselves disagreed on the 
scope of forced labor in relation to trafficking. The Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, the supervisory body 
entrusted with technical supervision of the application of the ILO Conventions, 
viewed forced labor as encompassing trafficking.75 Others proposed that both 
concepts were not identical, but shared some areas of overlap.76 The U.N. 
Protocol itself conceptualizes trafficking as covering a range of exploitative labor 
forms of which forced labor is only one form. As this Article goes to print, 
standard setting on forced labor has been placed on the agenda of the 2014 
International Labour Conference, rendering it a likely reform. Given that the 
moral leadership of the ILO on an issue such as trafficking is at stake, clarifying 
the relationship between trafficking and forced labor will become essential as 
many countries seek to conform their domestic legislation on trafficking to the 
Protocol definition. 
Meanwhile, Article 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention77 defines slavery as 
“the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching 
to the rights of ownership are exercised.”78 The travaux préparatoires to the 
Convention reveal “that the phrase ‘slavery in all its forms’ was not intended to, 
and does not operate to, expand the definition beyond those practices involving 
the demonstrable exercise of powers attached to the right of ownership.”79 Thus, 
states explicitly rejected attempts to expand the notion of slavery to what they 
 
71. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 25. 
72. See id. ¶ 24–25, 27. 
73. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, A GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST FORCED LABOUR ¶ 13 (2005), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/ 
publication/wcms_081882.pdf. 
74. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 42, ¶ 17. 
75. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 57. 
76. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 42, ¶ 51. 
77. Slavery Convention art. 1, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253. 
78. Id. at 263. 
79. Gallagher, supra note 25, at 800–01. 
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considered to be lesser forms of severe exploitation such as servitude.80 The 
conceptual distinctness of slavery is also evident in international human rights law 
and international criminal law.81 The 1956 Supplementary Convention on the 
Elaboration of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery82 distinguishes between slavery and slavery-like practices such as debt 
bondage,83 serfdom, servile forms of marriage, and the exploitation of children. 
Interestingly, in a recent representation to the ILO, the UNODC viewed bonded 
labor as being outside the ambit of the Article 3 definition of trafficking.84 Finally, 
servitude is separate and broader than slavery. Although the final version of the 
Protocol does not define servitude, the seventh revised draft of the Protocol85 
defines it as “the condition of a person who is unlawfully compelled or coerced by 
another to render any service to the same person or to others and who has no 
reasonable alternative but to perform the service, and shall include domestic 
service and debt bondage.”86 
4. The Interplay Between Coercion and Exploitation 
In a nutshell, the U.N. Protocol offers an expansive understanding of both 
the means of trafficking as well as the purpose for which one is trafficked, namely, 
exploitation. Despite the centrality of the concepts of coercion and exploitation to 
the U.N. Protocol, the U.N. Protocol does not define them and their meaning 
under international law is far from definitive even when clear. Indeed, even 
according to the ILO, discussions amongst jurists and lawmakers on the 
definitional aspects of trafficking continue without clear resolution.87 A survey of 
the laws relating to trafficking in twelve jurisdictions found a widespread lack of 
clarity around the definition of trafficking.88 The UNODC further admits that the 
lack of clarity over the parameters of trafficking hinders detection of trafficked 
victims and overall enforcement efforts.89 Each of these two central legal concepts 
 
80. Id. at 801. 
81. See id. at 802–03, 805–08. 
82. United Nations Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18.3 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, 41–
43. 
83. The Supplementary Convention defines debt bondage as “the status or condition arising 
from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security 
for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation 
of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined.” Id. art. 
1(a). 
84. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 42, ¶ 23. 
85. Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, supra note 53. 
86. Id. art. 2 bis(c). Chuang notes that servitude refers to the concept of servile status found in 
the Supplementary Slavery Convention and thus would include debt bondage, servile marriage, and 
trafficking in children. Chuang, supra note 17, at 1708 n.215. 
87. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶¶ 17. 
88. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 5. 
89. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 67, at 89. 
          
370 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:353 
in the law of trafficking, namely, the means and purpose, both span a continuum 
of possibilities. The means of coercion can range from legally recognizable and 
fairly narrowly construed notions of coercion, deception, fraud, and abduction 
(termed as “strong coercion” for ease of reference90) to the capacious, outlier 
concept of the abuse of a position of vulnerability (weak coercion). Similarly, while 
Article 3 points to specific labor conditions that constitute exploitation and are 
recognized and understood under international law (strong exploitation), this list 
of labor conditions is not exhaustive and could well include a range of working 
conditions that are best described as precarious, exploitative, and normatively 
reprehensible (weak exploitation). 
A narrow construction of the offence of trafficking might entail means of 
entry such as coercion understood in terms of violence, deception or fraud (strong 
coercion) resulting in slavery (strong exploitation). A paradigmatic example would 
be the trafficking episode etched in our minds through repeated iterations by the 
media, namely, of the young woman who is offered a well-paying job as a nanny 
but is duped into doing sex work in a foreign country against her will and under 
threat of physical and sexual violence for no pay. In contrast, a broader 
construction of the offence of trafficking may penalize the recruitment of a victim 
by abuse of the position of vulnerability (weak coercion) resulting in precarious 
work with less than minimum-wage pay (weak exploitation). An example would be 
of a Netherlands case where anti-trafficking law was invoked against a restaurant 
owner who employed undocumented migrant workers (who begged him for a job) 
working for far less than the Dutch minimum wage.91 This incredible malleability 
of the definition of trafficking, although frustrating for lawyers, also suggests the 
ability of states to tailor the offence according to their need and political, ethical, 
and normative desire. 
The offence of trafficking (at least in adults) requires both the means and 
exploitative purpose to be proved although states are known to dispense with the 
one or the other.92 As countries increasingly ratify the U.N. Protocol, their 
domestic legal mediations of the coercion-exploitation balance vary quite 
dramatically. Some countries are focused on coercive entry into labor markets 
(United States), others on degrading conditions (e.g., Belgium, France, Germany), 
with countries like Brazil targeting both.93 States that dispense with the means 
element rather than the purpose element may assume that an exploitative labor 
form must necessarily involve some form of coercion. Where means are dispensed 
with, the scope of anti-trafficking law depends on the interpretive breadth of the 
 
90. The terms “strong” and “weak” are not used to qualify the quality or quantity of the 
means of trafficking but simply to indicate the levels of relative legal certainty or legal malleability 
around them. 
91. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 38–39. 
92. See id. at 5, 48–55. 
93. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶¶ 118–20. 
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term “exploitation.”94 However, there is no necessary correlation between a 
coercive means of entry and an exploitative purpose.95 In other words, coerced 
entry into a labor sector can exist without exploitation, while exploitation can 
occur without coerced entry. To illustrate, a domestic worker entering the United 
Kingdom legally could well be paid far less than the minimum wage in a 
household that she works in and thus be exploited. A female migrant duped into 
sex work on the other hand, may well earn a lot more than she would have ever 
earned in her previous employment and therefore not be exploited; exploitation 
being understood here in purely economic terms.96 
Some states may grade offences along a continuum with slavery at one end 
and exploitation at the other, and with forced labor somewhere in between.97 
Where states incorporate both the means and purpose into their definition of 
trafficking, they may still dispense with certain elements of the means. In all of 
these instances, apart from the ambiguity of the legal concept at hand, the criminal 
law jurisprudence of the state can have a significant impact on the breadth of the 
anti-trafficking offence. Crimes typically require both the conduct element (actus 
reus) and the mental element (mens rea) to be satisfied. The mens rea element for 
the offence of trafficking can purportedly range from ulterior intent (the strongest 
version of the mens rea of intention), recklessness (knowingly taking an 
unjustifiable risk), and negligence (failure to discharge a duty) to mere 
knowledge.98 It is not clear whether the standard of mens rea varies according to 
the means of entry, yet they are highly likely to correspond. Hence, the culpability 
required for a means of trafficking through fraud or deception is likely to be 
greater than that required for an abuse of position of vulnerability, where being 
reckless as to the possibility of a person being exploited may suffice. These 
doctrinal legal implications of anti-trafficking law have received little academic 
attention, although some scholars have justified imposing strict liability on 
purchasers of sex on the grounds of criminal law ideas of complicity and 
endangerment.99 
In assessing the architecture of anti-trafficking law, the ILO’s Operational 
Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings are instructive.100 These are merely 
 
94. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 51, 54–55. 
95. See Jacqueline Bhabha, Trafficking, Smuggling, and Human Rights, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE 
(Mar. 2005), http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=294. 
96. For my discussion on theorizing exploitation, see infra Part II.D. 
97. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 118–20. 
98. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 20 n.24, 86. 
99. See Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense of Feminist 
Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1756–57 (2010). For a different view, see David Archard, 
Criminalising the Use of Trafficked Prostitutes: Some Philosophical Issues, in DEMANDING SEX: CRITICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON THE REGULATION OF PROSTITUTION 149, 156–59 (Vanesse E. Munro & Marina 
Della Giusta eds., 2008). 
100. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INT’L LABOUR ORG., OPERATIONAL INDICATORS OF 
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: RESULTS FROM A DELPHI SURVEY IMPLEMENTED BY THE ILO 
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indicators to help collect data and assist practitioners and labor inspectors in 
identifying incidents of trafficking and do not set out substantive legal 
requirements. Yet, they elaborate in great detail the myriad aspects of trafficking 
and offer a window into the factors that a state might consider in fashioning an 
offence of trafficking. The ILO delineates four sets of indicators for adults and 
children who are victims in sex work or in other forms of labor exploitation. Each 
victim must cumulatively satisfy six dimensions of the trafficking definition 
measured through the presence of two strong indicators, three medium indicators, 
or a combination of strong, medium, and weak indicators for each of the 
dimensions. The six dimensions include recruitment by deception, coercion and 
abuse of vulnerability, exploitative work, and coercion and abuse of vulnerability 
at the destination. These criteria clearly exceed the formal legal requirements of 
the definition of trafficking under the U.N. Protocol, which requires only one of 
the several means of trafficking to be present along with exploitation with no 
reference to coercion or abuse of vulnerability at the destination.101 Further still, 
the ILO Indicators treat trafficking for sex work differentially from trafficking for 
other labor so that the presence of certain medium level indicators in labor 
trafficking would constitute strong indicators when present in the context of 
trafficking for sex work. The general effect of this elaboration is to delineate a 
small category of trafficked victims who are deceived, exploited, and coerced, as 
distinct from (a) successful migrants, (b) exploited migrants who are not deceived 
or coerced, and (c) victims who are deceived and exploited but not coerced (at the 
point of recruitment and destination). The ILO thus places a premium on being 
coerced so a migrant could be exploited, but in order to be trafficked, coercion is 
required. Interestingly, a review of the indicators suggests that coercion is 
indicated predominantly by force, threat, and violence. This predilection towards 
coercion rather than exploitation is mirrored in domestic legal regimes such as the 
VTVPA.102 While some commentators attribute the narrow formulation of the 
means of entry within the VTVPA to “force, fraud, or coercion” to the need for 
the law to pass constitutional muster given the vagueness of terms such as the 
 
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public 
/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_105023.pdf. 
101. For a similar critique of the ILO Indicators, see UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS 
& CRIME, supra note 33, at 26. 
102. See Section 8 of the VTVPA’s definitions, which defines severe forms of trafficking as 
requiring force, fraud or coercion into the exploitative forms of labor listed therein. Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, § 103(8), 114 Stat. 1464, 1474 
(2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7104 (2012)). This limited interpretation of coercion is particularly seen 
in the process of identifying victims of trafficking. Given the priority of the UK government to crack 
down on illegal migration, NGOs have pointed to how the UK Border Agency is permeated with a 
culture of disbelief where officials are less likely to believe that persons with illegal or irregular 
immigration status are credible. In these circumstances, victims who can prove their coercion are 
privileged over those who cannot. See Juliane Heider, Un-Defining “Trafficking”: A Proposal to Re-
Align Migration, Labour and “Exploitation” 12 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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abuse of position of vulnerability,103 others argue that this is a deliberate way to 
discourage unlawful migration. In other words, the U.S. government prefers to 
treat smuggled migrants subject to exploitation as ineligible for the protections 
available to trafficked victims who have entered the country by means of force, 
fraud, or coercion.104 
Based on this analysis, we could conceptualize anti-trafficking law in terms of 
a pyramid of trafficking offences with trafficking episodes involving strong 
coercion and strong exploitation forming a narrow sliver at the top of the 
pyramid, while the base is occupied by instances characterized by weak coercion in 
relation to the means and weak exploitation in relation to the purpose.105 In the 
context of transnational labor markets, intermediate categories of trafficking might 
include scenarios characterized by strong coercion (e.g., deception into a certain 
line of work) and weak exploitation (e.g., pay below minimum wage) and weak 
coercion (e.g., abuse of position of vulnerability) and strong exploitation (e.g., debt 
bondage). There are two additional dimensions along which anti-trafficking law 
operates. The first is the legality of the means of entry, and the second is the 
legality of the sector in which trafficked labor is carried out. One can thus 
visualize at least sixteen scenarios based on these four factors that would implicate 
anti-trafficking law, only a minute fraction of which anti-trafficking law targets in 
reality. 
Further, over the life of a trafficking episode, there is considerable fluidity 
between statuses. A migrant may start out by migrating legally, but given the 
complete lack of protection within the formal sector and high levels of abuse, 
deploy the strategy of “absconding” to shift into an undocumented immigration 
status. This is illustrated by the case of an Indian migrant worker in the United 
Arab Emirates who enters the country legally to work in the construction industry, 
is not paid his wages for five months, and suffers a work-related accident yet has 
to continue working. Hence he “abscond[s].”106 Here the “structural violence”107 
of the kefala system108 leads many migrants to work in the informal economy due 
to workers’ inability to resolve work-related issues with their sponsor 
employers.109 Alternatively, migrants could move from a lawful sector like 
domestic work where levels of abuse are so high that migrant women prefer to 
 
103. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 45. 
104. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of 
Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1635 (2010). 
105. The clarity and certainty around a narrow definition of trafficking might result in a higher 
rate of prosecution. Alternatively, a broader definition of trafficking might result in greater 
prosecutorial discretion thus bringing down the rate of prosecution. 
106. MAHDAVI, supra note 30, at 94. 
107. See id. at 95–97. 
108. This is where the law of the host state requires migrant workers to be tied to their 
employers such that they are prevented from switching employers. This system undermines migrants’ 
bargaining power and forces them to work and live in poor conditions. 
109. See MAHDAVI, supra note 30, at 130–34. 
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resort to an illegal employment sector like sex work. This is true for both 
undocumented migrants as well as those with legal status in the destination 
state.110 Thus, we find Bangladeshi women and men who migrate to the Middle 
East on a company visa to work as janitors, but are not informed about their 
conditions of work, especially pay levels. They reach the host state and discover 
that they can barely make ends meet on their meager salary, which is not paid on 
time. Female migrants under tremendous pressure not to return home with an 
empty hand then have no choice but to resort to sex work. Thus, 89.2% of 
returnees who went on a company visa to do domestic work had to voluntarily 
take up sex work.111 Mahdavi similarly writes of domestic workers in the United 
Arab Emirates who routinely turn to sex work in search of increased autonomy 
and higher wages,112 their reasoning being that “if we don’t have rights as maids or 
prostitutes, then we might as well be prostitutes so we can make more money.”113 
Viewed this way, it is not hard to understand why some states have focused 
unduly on targeting prostitution through anti-trafficking law. Given the highly 
stigmatized nature of sex work, it ticks the boxes of both coercion and 
exploitation per se, the reasoning being that who but a coerced person would want 
to do sex work, and how can sex work be anything other than exploitative? I will 
elaborate on this particularistic interpretation of anti-trafficking law in the next 
section. Yet it is not entirely certain that anti-trafficking law will always take 
seriously instances of trafficking at the top of the pyramid of anti-trafficking 
offences involving strong coercion and strong exploitation. The preoccupation of 
many Western states with border control means that there is an inordinate 
emphasis on the legality of the means of entry. The focus is on preventing those 
migrating without proper documents while turning a blind eye to someone who is 
crossing borders legally. Similarly, where the labor sector at the destination is 
lawful under domestic law, states may turn a blind eye to exploitation. Thus, we 
have a victim of trafficking recruited by means of strong coercion for purposes of 
strong exploitation, but who falls off the radar screen of anti-trafficking law in the 
host state. This is illustrated by the case of a migrant worker from the Philippines 
who is recruited by deception to do factory work in the United Arab Emirates, but 
finds himself illegally deployed to clean septic tanks on an American army base in 
Iraq, which he is not allowed to leave.114 
Migrants legally entering labor markets through the spectrum of strong or 
weak means of coercion for varied levels of exploitation do not fare better either. 
Thus, we find no legal protection for an Ethiopian migrant who believes she is 
travelling to Dubai on a hotel maid visa, but is instead made to work in a hospital 
 
110. See id. at 135. 
111. THÉRÈSE BLANCHET, BEYOND BOUNDARIES: A CRITICAL LOOK AT WOMEN LABOUR 
MIGRATION AND THE TRAFFICKING WITHIN 58 (2002). 
112. MAHDAVI, supra note 30, at 126. 
113. Id. at 125. 
114. See id. at 97–101. 
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(strong coercion) under extremely poor conditions (weak exploitation).115 
Conversely, Filipina hostesses in Tokyo’s nightlife industry enter into several 
contracts with intermediaries in the Philippines in order to work in Japan on an 
entertainer visa knowing fully well that some level of sexualized interaction is 
essential (weak coercion). Several of these contracts give rise to debt bondage and 
indentured labor (strong exploitation), but are rendered invisible through the 
legitimating language of the written contract and the employment visa, which 
makes migration possible. The buffer of Filipino managers and promotion 
agencies meant to safeguard the interests of migrant workers in fact creates the 
very conditions for the trafficking of these women whose sexualized work renders 
them trafficked in the popular imagination, not the matrix of exploitative 
contracts.116 
5. Ambiguity, Conflation, and Diffusion: Mapping the Intended and Unintended Consequences 
of Anti-Trafficking Law 
In the previous section, I set out the conceptual scaffolding of anti-
trafficking law as exemplified by the U.N. Protocol. Confirming the highly 
restrictive reach of anti-trafficking law is the preliminary assessment of its impact 
by a range of nongovernmental actors almost ten years after the adoption of the 
U.N. Protocol. Critics may rightly ask how we can definitively assess the impact of 
the U.N. Protocol, much less the collateral damage117 that it has generated, given 
the conceptual ambiguity at its heart and the lack of reliable data tracking the 
phenomenon. Even for an international legal instrument that has been immensely 
successful in terms of its ratification status,118 the operationalization of 
international law into domestic legal norms can be a lengthy process spanning 
several years.119 However, the preliminary assessment as to the impact of the U.N. 
Protocol for sex workers,120 migrants121 and trafficked victims themselves122 is 
 
115. See id. at 106–09. 
116. Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, Trafficked? Filipino Hostesses in Tokyo’s Nightlife Industry, 18 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 168 (2006). 
117. See Dottridge, supra note 47, at 20. 
118. As of December 2013, 159 countries are party to the U.N. Protocol. INT’L LABOUR 
OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 64. Moreover, within five years of the coming into force of the U.N. 
Protocol, 63% of the 155 countries surveyed by the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime in 2008 had 
passed laws against major forms of trafficking. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra 
note 10, at 8. Similarly, there have been an incredible number of action plans against trafficking unlike 
against forced labor. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 90. 
119. Indeed this was the case with the 1949 U.N. Convention. To illustrate, India was a 
signatory to the Convention, but domestic law conforming to international legal obligations was not 
passed by the Indian Parliament until 1956. See Ratna Kapur, India, in GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST 
TRAFFIC IN WOMEN, supra note 47, at 114, 115–16. 
120. Sixteen percent of the 155 countries surveyed by UNODC in 2009 had passed anti-
trafficking laws that were limited to sexual exploitation or covered only women and children. UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 8. According to the UNODC, the most 
commonly identified form of human trafficking is sexual exploitation, although it admits that this 
high percentage is likely to be a result of statistical bias of much of the data it relied on which came 
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from European countries; these are more likely to detect victims compared to other regions. UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 67, at 11. In the 2009 Report, this was explained 
in terms of the greater visibility of sexual exploitation when compared to exploitation in other labor 
sectors. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 11. At the regional level, as 
with the 2002 South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution, trafficking was explicitly 
identified with trafficking for sex work, while the definition of trafficking is based on the 1949 U.N. 
Suppression of Traffic Convention, not the 2000 U.N. Protocol. South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation, Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and 
Children for Prostitution, Jan. 5, 2002, http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/conv-traffiking.pdf. Even 
in countries that have ratified the U.N. Protocol, law enforcement officials imply that entry into sex 
work amounts to trafficking. See Dottridge, supra note 47, at 15. Interestingly, despite the focus on 
prostitution itself, very little has been done to promote the human or labor rights of those who 
prostitute. If anything, anti-prostitution funding restrictions effectuated by the Bush administration in 
the name of combating sex trafficking undermined HIV prevention efforts amongst sex workers 
when basic social services to certain sex worker populations were withdrawn. Chuang, supra note 17, 
at 1713. Undocumented migrant brothel workers, for instance, have no protection under the VTVPA 
because they have not been coerced or duped into sex work, even if they find themselves in slave-like 
conditions. See April Rieger, Missing the Mark: Why the Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fails to Protect Sex 
Trafficking Victims in the United States, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 231, 249 (2007). Technically, these 
women should also have the benefit of the law if their working conditions are poor, but the 
prosecution officers are unlikely to make this nuanced distinction. See id. at 249–50. This can be 
attributed to the underlying distinction between the good victim and bad prostitute, not unfamiliar to 
lawyers in other areas of sexual violence. See Vanessa E. Munro, Of Rights and Rhetoric: Discourses of 
Degradation and Exploitation in the Context of Sex Trafficking, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 240, 243 (2008). Further 
enhancing the distinction between deserving and undeserving victims is the fact that sex trafficking 
victims are granted assistance in some countries only on the condition that they assist the prosecution 
machinery. In the case of the VTVPA for instance, only victims of “severe” forms of trafficking are 
eligible for benefits. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–
386, § 103(8), 114 Stat. 1464, 1474 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7104 (2012)). This involves a 
cumbersome, long drawn-out certification program, which is inordinately tied to requirements to 
assist in the trafficker’s prosecution. See Rieger, supra, at 247–52. Such distinctions have implications 
for prostitution law reform in domestic legal jurisdictions as well. At the national level, the South 
Korean statute, the Sex Trade Prevention Act, 2004, whose passage managed to place the country in 
Tier 1 of the U.S. TIP Report, mandated that only victim sex workers were to be decriminalized and 
not sex workers who worked voluntarily. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 44, at 210–11. 
Abolitionists lay the blame for this on sex work advocates who they say insisted on “sex workers’ 
agency and the forced/free distinction,” which was deployed in domestic contexts to “promote a 
conservative male sexual ethic.” KOTISWARAN, supra note 18, at 37 (citing SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE 
INDUSTRIAL VAGINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GLOBAL SEX TRADE 206 (2009)). 
“Similarly, in India a report commissioned by the National Human Rights Commission recommended 
an interpretation of  existing law to decriminalize soliciting by survivors of ‘commercial sexual 
exploitation’ but not by victims who continued to do sex work.” Id. (citing SANKAR SEN & P. M. 
NAIR, INST. OF SOC. SCIS., TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN INDIA 231 (2005)). Sadly, 
where the U.N. Protocol encourages states to pursue demand reduction strategies under Article 9, it is 
not unforeseeable for states to selectively apply this to the sex industry. The popularity of the Swedish 
model criminalizing customers is testament to this. From then on, states could embark on a slippery 
slope to also target the supply of sex workers. 
121. From the time of the passage of the U.N. Protocol, border control is said to have been at 
the heart of the Protocol as the very passage of the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime was motivated by sovereignty and security concerns rather than the human rights of migrant 
and trafficked groups. Gallagher, supra note 38, at 994, 976; Halley et al., supra note 5, at 389; 
Hathaway, supra note 24, at 6. The Protocol has prevented migration, including of those migrants who 
cross borders illegally or earn money illicitly rather than addressing the various forms of exploitation 
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sobering. The negative fallout of contemporary anti-trafficking law can be 
attributed to the inherent ambiguity of legal concepts that are central to the U.N. 
Protocol, the international upstaging of the U.N. Protocol by the VTVPA and its 
annual TIP reports, and the special ideological status that sex work has enjoyed in 
the anti-trafficking debates, which have detracted from a sophisticated 
understanding of the interrelation between coercion and exploitation. 
As has been well documented, much of the momentum relating to anti-
trafficking law emerged from the international reach of the U.S. domestic law, the 
VTVPA, and its mechanism of the TIP Report released every year. What really 
cemented the influence of the TIP reports is its normative condemnation of sex 
work. A range of U.S. foreign policy initiatives unleashed by the Bush 
administration detailed elsewhere further contributed to this impact.123 
Significantly, the TIP reports have been known to conflate sex work and 
trafficking from the very beginning while advancing the U.S. government’s 
campaign against sex work internationally.124 The TIP reports have only delineated 
sex work from trafficking since 2009.125 In the meantime, the TIP Report 
mechanism has upstaged the U.N. Protocol such that the “performance of 
governments with respect to trafficking is currently being assessed, not with 
reference to the international rules that states (including the United States) have 
collectively developed and freely accepted, but against criteria drawn up and 
imposed by U.S. bureaucrats and politicians.”126 Due to the influence of the 
VTVPA, the sex sector has been “the primary focus of most countries’ ‘anti-
 
listed in the U.N. Protocol or protecting the human rights of trafficked persons. Dottridge, supra note 
47, at 1, 12, 15. The denial by both the U.N. Protocol and the Migrant Smuggling Protocol of the 
complexity of real world migration scenarios means that developed countries have policed the line 
between smuggling and trafficking vigilantly so that unlawful immigration is discouraged. Chacón, 
supra note 104, at 1627. Meanwhile, the criminalization of smuggling also fosters trafficking, 
Hathaway, supra note 24, at 5, at 34; see also Chacón, supra note 104, at 1640–41, and increases 
exploitative conditions in destination countries while preventing refugees from exercising their rights 
under international law. Hathaway, supra note 24, at 35–36; see also Satvinder S. Juss, Human Trafficking, 
Asylum and the Problem of Protection, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MIGRATION LAW, 
THEORY AND POLICY 281, 294 (Satvinder S. Juss ed., 2013). Thus, both countries of origin and of 
transit Hathaway claims have been “effectively conscripted as agents of first world states of 
destination,” Hathaway, supra note 24, at 27, so as to control migration at a minimal cost resulting in 
significant damage to human rights concerns. Id. at 30. Perversely, trafficking has been invoked as the 
driving force behind immigration enforcement thus putting a “human rights gloss on a border-
enforcement model.” Chacón, supra note 104, at 1642. Similar rhetoric is seen emerging from the UK 
government. See Anderson, supra note 38, at 5. 
122. Less than two thousand people had availed themselves of the T visa since 2000 in the 
United States. Chacón, supra note 104, at 1614. Thus, in the case of the United States, the VTVPA has 
proved to be a law that is too narrow to reach a significant portion of the domestic trafficking 
problem. Chacón, supra note 10, at 2987.  
123. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1680–82. 
124. Gallagher, supra note 31, at 386. 
125. See id. 
126. Id. at 382. 
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trafficking’ efforts.”127 Hence, the efforts of human rights anti-trafficking NGOs 
at the U.N. Protocol negotiations to decouple trafficking from prostitution and 
thus shake off the legacy of the 1949 U.N. Convention have been far from 
successful. Not only was trafficking being comprehended by states in terms of 
trafficking for sex work, but sex work has also been conflated with trafficking. 
There are indications that this trend may be becoming less strong.128 Thus, 
the UNODC’s latest report on global trafficking suggests that more countries now 
have comprehensive definitions of trafficking than before.129 The ILO points to 
how trafficking for labor exploitation is receiving increased attention after an 
initial focus on trafficking for sexual exploitation.130 Further, the definition of 
trafficking in many countries covers trafficking for both labor and sexual 
exploitation.131 That the critique of sex workers’ organizations against the 
conflation of trafficking with sex work is gaining ground was evident most 
recently in India. Here, in the context of rape law reform, a Presidential Ordinance 
defined trafficking by conflating it with prostitution. This was so strongly 
protested by sex workers’ groups that a Parliamentary statute replacing the 
Ordinance modified the trafficking offence to define exploitation in terms of 
physical and sexual exploitation instead of prostitution. Yet the moral charge that 
prostitution produces means that it is likely to continue to have traction amongst 
governments in their anti-trafficking policy. Indeed, the new trafficking offences 
under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)132 also criminalize the use of a trafficked 
person for sexual exploitation but not other forms of exploitation. Thus, the ILO 
notes that prosecution rates for trafficking for labor exploitation continues to be 
low, rather than for trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation.133 
In conclusion, the discussion in Part I suggests that trafficking is a complex 
international problem involving men and women implicated in varying degrees of 
coercion and exploitation whose movement and conditions of work are further 
legal or undocumented. Against this backdrop, domestic criminal law mechanisms 
 
127. Julia O’Connell Davidson, Will the Real Sex Slave Please Stand Up?, FEMINIST REV., Aug. 
2006, at 4, 11; see also Chuang, supra note 17, at 1657; Dottridge, supra note 47, at 12. This is 
particularly true of the United States. See Chacón, supra note 104, at 1623 n.59 (pointing to the 
overwhelming enforcement of trafficking for sex work rather than other labor sectors); Grace Chang 
& Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the 
Field(s), 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 318, 320–28 (2007). 
128. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 15. 
129. The percentage of countries criminalizing only some aspects of trafficking decreased 
from 17% in 2008 to 11% in 2012. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 67, at 
83. 
130. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 120. 
131. Id. 
132. The Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 2013, No. 13 of 2013 (India), available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/132013.pdf. 
133. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 131. Similarly, the interpretation of certain 
means of trafficking such as the abuse of position of vulnerability is likely to be influenced by whether 
it is for purposes of sexual exploitation. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra 
note 33, at 81. 
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are an ineffective yet sharp instrument that includes and excludes legal subjects 
arbitrarily. Given this situation, in the next Part, I offer a critique of anti-
trafficking law by delineating alternate legal imaginings of coercion and 
exploitation and institutional mechanisms in order to target trafficking. 
II. REORIENTING ANTI-TRAFFICKING DISCOURSE 
A substantial amount of scholarship seeks to reorient contemporary anti-
trafficking discourse and overwhelmingly refers to issues of poverty, structural 
adjustment policies, gender inequality, wide domestic socio-economic disparities, 
transitional economies, immigration laws, and migration policies as factors that 
influence trafficking. As Chuang observes, the current anti-trafficking discourse 
has 
embedded in the public consciousness a reductive narrative of 
trafficking. . . . from a complex human rights problem rooted in the 
failure of migration and labor frameworks to respond to globalizing 
trends, to a moral problem and crime of sexual violence against women 
and girls best addressed through an aggressive criminal justice 
response.134 
Thus, several scholars have put forth the migration frame for making sense 
of trafficking,135 even suggesting that “the mainstream discourse on trafficking is 
nothing more than a campaign to stop the international migration of women.”136 
They have also highlighted the significance of the labor rights approach in 
critiquing the current trajectory of anti-trafficking law.137 I both draw on and build 
upon such research. 
As I have demonstrated so far, the two significant drawbacks of anti-
trafficking legal discourse are as follows. Anti-trafficking discourse exceptionalizes 
trafficking in terms of trafficking for sex work and sex work as an exceptional form 
of female labor that must be cordoned off from other female labor markets and 
eliminated through the use of prohibitionist criminal law. Here, I attempt to de-
exceptionalize both. Needless to say, the project of de-exceptionalizing trafficking 
as being solely for sex work is better developed than the project of de-
exceptionalizing sex work. Many scholars have highlighted the vast range of labor 
sectors into which workers are trafficked, labeling this “labor trafficking” in 
contrast to “sex trafficking.” For some, the very term “sex trafficking” and its 
 
134. Chuang, supra note 17, at 1694. 
135. Jacqueline Berman, Biopolitical Management, Economic Calculation and “Trafficked Women,” 48 
INT’L MIGRATION 85, 89 (2010). 
136. Parreñas, supra note 116, at 147 (citing Laura M. Agustín, Challenging Place: Leaving Home 
for Sex, 45 DEV. 110 (2002)). 
137. See generally James Gray Pope, A Free Labor Approach to Human Trafficking, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1849, 1871–74 (2010) (applying a “free labor” perspective to the problem of sex trafficking); 
Hila Shamir, A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 105–19 (2012) (arguing 
that a labor rights approach would provide more effective strategies to combat trafficking than the 
human rights approach). 
          
380 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:353 
privileged position as a major form of trafficking138 alongside “labor trafficking” 
exceptionalizes the harm that those trafficked into sex work suffer from. Indeed, 
the denial of sex work as a form of labor within which some trafficking occurs is 
remarkable, suggesting the abolitionist subtext of the use of the term. Others have 
argued that this distinction is misleading because labor trafficking is a gendered 
phenomenon139 and is often accompanied by sexual abuse.140 While 
acknowledging these feminist insights, for the time being, I will de-exceptionalize 
trafficking by drawing on alternate legal imaginaries surrounding coerced 
migration in ordinary times, as distinguished from moments of moral panic. Since 
these responses were meant to deal with the trafficking of men for labor, they are 
therefore drained of the abolitionist energy fostered by a global sex panic that 
repeatedly puts anti-trafficking law at risk of misuse. 
A. Domestic “Anti-Trafficking Law”: The Case of India 
The contemporary legal regime on trafficking, especially the annual TIP 
reports released by the U.S. State Department under the VTVPA and the various 
antiprostitution policies of the erstwhile Bush administration141 have had an 
enormous influence on the Indian state’s disposition towards regulating 
trafficking. India figured in Tier 2 of the TIP report for the first three years 
(2001,142 2002,143 and 2003144) of the TIP reporting before being placed on the 
Tier Two Watch List between 2004145 and 2010.146 It was only in 2011 that India 
was moved back to the normal Tier Two List.147 That year, India also ratified the 
U.N. Protocol, which it had signed back in December 2002. Since 2006 however, 
the Indian government, keen to be upgraded in the TIP rankings, attempted to 
strengthen Indian anti-trafficking law in the form of a proposed amendment to 
the Indian anti-sex work criminal law, the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1986 
(ITPA).148 The proposed amendment followed the Swedish model, where 
 
138. Twenty-two percent of the world’s forced laborers are in forced sexual exploitation as 
opposed to sixty-eight percent in forced labor exploitation according to the ILO. INT’L LABOUR 
OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 2. 
139. Melynda H. Barnhart, Sex and Slavery: An Analysis of Three Models of State Human Trafficking 
Legislation, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 83, 93–94 (2009). However, Barnhart ultimately 
recommends that trafficking for sex work and for other labor should not be bifurcated given that they 
are interrelated systems of abuse and oppression; she calls for a single definition of human trafficking. 
Id. at 131. 
140. Id. at 91. 
141. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1683–93; Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: 
Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 474–81 (2006); Halley 
et al., supra note 5, 359–60. 
142. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 12 (2001). 
143. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 17 (2002). 
144. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 21 (2003). 
145. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 39 (2004). 
146. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 53 (2010). 
147. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 52 (2011). 
148. See Prabha Kotiswaran, Introduction to SEX WORK, at xi (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2011). 
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authorities seek criminalization for the customers of trafficked sex workers. The 
proposed amendment lapsed in Parliament in March 2009 due to governmental 
dissonance, fostered largely by the countervailing influence of the public health 
complex, which has for years undertaken HIV prevention work in sex worker 
communities with international donor funding. The HIV prevention complex—
and indeed the Indian health ministry—viewed the proposed amendment to the 
ITPA as significantly detrimental to these efforts, as it would have the effect of 
driving the sex industry underground.149 However, the preliminary impulse of the 
Indian state, like other states, was to offer a reactive response to the U.N. 
Protocol by limiting trafficking to trafficking for sex work.150 
That this impulse is a powerful one was evident once again in recent months. 
In response to the gang rape and death of a twenty-three-year-old woman, the 
President of India promulgated an ordinance on violence against women in 
February 2013, which contained two provisions criminalizing trafficking and 
employing a trafficked person.151 Although the ordinance substantially mirrored 
the Article 3 definition of trafficking, it defined exploitation as including 
prostitution, in effect conflating trafficking with sex work. As a result of the 
forceful lobbying of the Law Ministry by Indian sex workers’ groups, the two anti-
trafficking provisions of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2013, recently 
passed by Parliament and signed into law as of April 3, 2013, sought to define 
exploitation for purposes of the offence of trafficking as including any act of 
physical exploitation and any form of sexual exploitation.152 In this circular 
definition of trafficking, Section 370, which criminalizes trafficking, dropped one 
of the means of trafficking listed under Article 3, namely, abuse of a position of 
vulnerability. The litany of the forms of exploitation under Section 370 also 
omitted reference to forced labor, the significance of which will emerge in my 
discussion of the relevant case law. Recognizing the role of targeting the demand 
for trafficked labor, Section 370A criminalizes anyone who engages a trafficked 
minor or adult, but only for purposes of sexual exploitation. So sexual 
exploitation, which is not defined in the Bill, continues to occupy a privileged 
 
149. See id.  
150. See Ratna Kapur, GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST TRAFFIC IN WOMEN, India, in 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 47, at 114, 128. The increased presence of the UNODC in India 
has meant the setting up of anti-human trafficking units in certain states with the aim of targeting sex 
work and rescuing victims of “commercial sexual exploitation.” See id. at 114–16. The National and 
State Crime Records Bureaus, which have for decades produced annual reports on crime statistics, 
introduced a new chapter on trafficking in 2006. NAT’L CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, MINISTRY OF 
HOME AFFAIRS, CRIME IN INDIA 2006 (2006), available at http://ncrb.nic.in/ciiprevious/Data/CD-
CII2006/cii-2006/CHAP6star.pdf. Fantastic public service announcements showing policemen 
placing large padlocks on brothels and Bollywood actors urging the populace to combat human 
trafficking are not uncommon. See, e.g., ONE LIFE, NO PRICE (UNODC public service 
announcement) available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ggv5ZKQpww0.  
151. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013, No. 3 of 2013 (India).  
152. See id.  
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position over trafficking in the myriad labor sectors of the Indian economy, 
including brick kilns, rice mills, farms, embroidery factories, mines, stone quarries, 
homes, and carpet factories. 
Historically speaking, Indian law has been attuned to the precarious labor 
conditions of millions of Indians. The Indian Constitution, as a self-styled radical 
legal document reflecting postcolonial aspirations for modern nationhood, is 
concerned with indigenous forms of servitude. Under Part III of the Indian 
Constitution dealing with fundamental rights, Article 23 prohibits the traffic in 
human beings and begar153 and other similar forms of forced labor, making the 
contravention of this provision an offence punishable in accordance with law. 
Article 23 does not however define these terms. Several provisions of the Indian 
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), deal with aspects of trafficking such as kidnapping or 
abduction (Sections 365, 367), procuring, buying and selling minors for 
prostitution (Sections 366A, 366B, 372, 373), slavery (Section 371), and unlawful 
compulsory labor (Section 374).154 Yet the Indian Penal Code does not define the 
terms slavery, bondage, forced labor, or begary. Many of the labor-related 
provisions in the IPC were a product of colonial law making. The exigencies of 
colonial rule in general did not permit the framing of a comprehensive policy to 
deal with forced labor in all its forms so that any policy or legislative changes were 
purely reactive.155 Indeed, the state compulsorily acquired labor for public works, 
the refusal of which was even visited by fine or imprisonment. It was thus left to 
the postcolonial Indian state to address the social realities of bonded labor, forced 
migration, and the deplorable conditions of migrant labor. These labor conditions 
are recounted memorably in a short story written by the famous Bengali novelist, 
Mahaswetha Devi, which is remarkably true to social reality. Over the decades, 
Devi’s work has painted for us a very detailed picture of the condition of tribal 
populations in postcolonial India. Although legible to the state through the 
constitutional legal category of “scheduled tribes,” these tribal groups are severely 
disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms, and are certainly absent from the popular 
consciousness of the Indian public. 
Devi’s The Fairytale of Rajbhasha is about a couple from the Kol tribe in the 
present-day Indian state of Jharkhand who are recruited by Nandlal, a 
moneylender to migrate to the prosperous farms of Punjab from their home 
 
153. Indian courts find “begar” requires showing “that the person has been forced to work 
against his will and without payment.” See Ram Khelwan Pathak v.. State Of U.P., (1998) 2 A.W.C. 
1171 (India); see also KARA, supra note 43, at 284 n.12. 
154. The Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860, INDIA CODE §§ 365–74, available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in. 
155. See Michael R. Anderson, Work Construed: Ideological Origins of Labour Law in British India to 
1918, in DALIT MOVEMENTS AND THE MEANINGS OF LABOUR IN INDIA 87, 119–20 (Peter Robb 
ed., 1993). They either sought to undermine the competitive advantage of Indian industry, to meet the 
labor needs of European employers or the colonial state, or were proposed (as with the abolition of 
slavery) in response to the social reform preferences of the British middle classes. See id. at 101–03, 
113–18. 
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village. Sarjom, a bonded laborer working for free on Nandlal’s farm to pay off his 
debt and Josmina, his wife, are promised a salary of four hundred rupees a month. 
Nandlal entices Sarjom as follows: 
An excellent job. Big farmers. Plenty to eat. Work for a short period. The 
two of you will get, say, about four hundred a month. Enough clothes. 
Work for a year and at the end of it—baap re baap [oh my]! You’ll come 
back with almost five thousand bucks! Sit at home and enjoy!156 
They accompany the moneylender little knowing that the plight that awaits 
them is a familiar one experienced by thousands of migrant laborers and contract 
workers travelling across the country. Sarjom and Josmina are sold for four 
hundred rupees to a wealthy farmer who is willing to pay them only 120 rupees 
(80 rupees for Sarjom and 40 for Josmina) for sixteen to 18 hours of work a day. 
At the end of each day, they are kept under lock and key. Worse, the employer 
repeatedly rapes Josmina. As they escape from him, forsaking their pay, they are 
retrafficked from one farmer to the next, until a benevolent farmer, whose son 
rapes Josmina, sends them back home with pay. Josmina discovers she is 
pregnant, and fearing that her family will be ostracized, commits suicide. This is 
the life story of Sarjom and Josmina, which Devi claims, like a fairy tale, has a 
beginning but no end. 
Sarjom and Josmina today would be considered victims of trafficking. After 
all, they are recruited and transported by the abuse of position of vulnerability (at 
the very least); if not for deception for the purpose of exploitation, including 
servitude and, in the case of Josmina, sexual exploitation. This form of domestic 
trafficking is comparable to cross-border trafficking in many respects. The tribals 
consider themselves to be different from the non-tribals, or dikus, and this 
includes Nandlal as well as the prosperous farmers of Punjab. Labor for the farms 
in Punjab is routinely hired from the tribal belt through a contractor, also called a 
Sardar, who subcontracts the job out to agents like Nandlal. The moneylender 
typically approaches tribals every year in September before the harvest season 
when they are on the verge of starvation and are therefore vulnerable to promises 
of a well-paying job. These tribals travel far and do not speak the language of the 
destination state, namely Hindi, and therefore experience their new environs as 
foreign. With their movement being restricted, they are unable to communicate 
with locals and hence unable to escape. Both local and migrant workers are paid 
well below the minimum wage, and women are paid half of what male laborers are 
paid. Yet, employers prefer migrant tribals to local workers as they are less 
expensive despite which local workers are sympathetic to the migrants’ plight. 
Often, as in the case of Sarjom, migrants are already bonded laborers, paying off 
old debts by working for free. However, these laborers are not naïve victims. 
When Nandlal for instance comes to Josmina’s house looking for Sarjom to 
 
156. MAHASWETA DEVI, The Fairytale of Rajabasha, in OUTCAST: FOUR STORIES 57, 62 
(Sarmistha Dutta Gupta trans., 2002). 
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propose migration to Punjab, she confronts him about his loan that they are 
paying off. Made aware of the moneylender’s exploitative practices by a local 
activist who is campaigning for the tribals’ right to the forest, Josmina asks the 
moneylender if their debt has not been almost paid off. She taunts him for making 
use of her husband’s labor for free, citing their debt to him as the only worry they 
face in life. Mahaswetha Devi further offers an insight into the decision making of 
the couple as they decide to migrate to Punjab. Even when Sarjom is enticed by 
Nandlal’s offer to earn several thousand rupees and return home to a life of 
luxury, Josmina is more discerning. She counsels him that the tribals have always 
stuck it out before the harvest season and suggests that they discuss Nandlal’s 
offer with the local activist. Several times during their stay in Punjab as well, 
Josmina and Sarjom plot their escape from their employers, trying to demand their 
dues ahead of time but with little success. 
B. De-Exceptionalizing Trafficking; Revisiting the Means 
It was precisely to deal with the labor conditions described by Devi that the 
Indian Parliament passed three statutes in the 1970s. I suggest that Sections 370 
and 370A of the IPC need to be read in conjunction with these three domestic 
anti-trafficking laws.157 To keep true to the tone of the statutes and court decisions 
that I consider, I will use the terms they employ rather than “trafficking,” 
suggesting that they offer the possibility of an alternate legal imagination of 
trafficking. Specifically, they are the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, 
as amended by the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Amendment Act, 1985 
(BLSAA), the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, as amended 
by the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Amendment Act No.14 of 1986 
(CLRAA), and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act (Regulation of Employment 
and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 (ISMWA). The BLSAA is a social legislation 
aimed at abolishing intergenerational bondage158 backed up by the force of the 
 
157. Cf. Kapur, supra note 150, at 128 (stating that Indian laws did not provide a 
comprehensive approach to trafficking through the broader framework of migration). The need to 
read these provisions in a complementary manner once again highlights the complexity of the 
phenomenon of trafficking requiring intervention at varied scales from different areas of the law. 
Note here the recommendation of the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in 
Persons: 
[T]he Trafficking in Persons Protocol is not sufficient to ensure a comprehensive and 
effective response to human trafficking. Instead, efforts must be made to ensure better 
understanding of the coherence between human rights law, refugee law, labour law and 
other relevant bodies of law, and the need to bring diverse but complementary instruments 
to bear on the trafficking challenge . . . . 
INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION GROUP AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS CONCERNING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 14 (2012), 
available at http://www.ungift.org/doc/knowledgehub/resource-centre/ICAT/ICAT_Policy_Paper 
_1_The_International_Legal_Instruments.pdf. 
158. The statement of objects and reasons to the legislation clearly indicates that it is aimed 
towards the abolition of a system existent in many parts of the country where “several generations 
work under bondage for the repayment of a small sum which had been taken by some remote 
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criminal law, whereas the other two statutes fall within the province of labor law. 
Together, they form an interlocking system consisting of both criminal and labor 
laws aimed at targeting trafficking. I will detail the broad framework of each of 
these statutes before examining their interpretation by the Indian courts. 
The BLSAA essentially abolishes the “bonded labor system,” which is 
defined as a system of forced/partly forced labor whereby a debtor enters, or is 
presumed to have entered, into an agreement with a creditor under which, in 
exchange for economic consideration, or in pursuance of any customary or social 
obligation or obligation devolving upon him by succession or by reason of his 
birth into any caste or community, he is required to work under certain 
conditions. As such, bonded labor would amount to “a practice similar to slavery” 
for purposes of Article 3 of the U.N. Protocol. Under the BLSAA, the terms 
“forced labor” and “partly forced labor” are not defined but the working 
conditions that they entail are listed under Section 2(g)(v). These include where 
the debtor renders his own labor or that of his family without wages or with the 
payment of nominal wages, gives up his freedom to sell his labor or the products 
of his labor, gives up his right to sell his property and gives up his freedom to 
move. “Nominal wages” are defined as a wage below the minimum wage or what 
is normally paid for the same or similar labor in that locality. It thus incorporates 
both the legal wage floor as well as the market wage floor. The term “agreement” 
provides both for an agreement voluntarily entered into by the debtor with the 
creditor but also presumes the existence of an agreement for forced labor under 
any social custom prevailing in a locality. These customs are listed in the 
legislation. Thus, the statute not only deals with bonded labor as a customary 
practice facilitated by the caste system, but also with supposedly voluntary 
agreements made under the force of circumstance whereby a debtor agrees to 
extremely harsh and ordinarily unacceptable working conditions amounting to 
forced labor. Note, however, that the movement or transportation of a laborer is 
not essential for him or her to be considered bonded. 
The broad ambit of the legislation as extending beyond customary 
intergenerational bonded labor was reiterated by an amendment in 1985, which 
declared that any contract laborer or interstate migrant laborer who performed 
labor under the conditions listed in Section 2(g)(v) would be assumed to be 
working under a bonded labor system, which ought to be abolished. Chapter II of 
the BLSAA outlaws bonded labor and prohibits and penalizes both existing and 
future bonded labor. All bonded laborers are set free and, by law, their obligation 
to pay back the debt is extinguished. The Act has several elaborate deeming 
provisions in relation to existing and future legal action arising from the debt. 
These provisions give us some inkling for what a victim centered anti-trafficking 
 
ancestor.” The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, No. 19 of 1976, INDIA CODE (1976), available 
at http://www.childlineindia.org.in/CP-CR-Downloads/Bonded%20Labour%20System%20%28Abolition 
%29%20Act%201976%20and%20Rules.pdf. 
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law organized through the criminal justice system might look like. Creditors 
accepting any repayment for an extinguished debt can face imprisonment and 
fines. Offenses are cognizable and bailable, while civil courts have no jurisdiction 
under the Act. Local district magistrates and subordinate officers have to ensure 
the Act’s implementation, the eradication of bonded labor, and the rehabilitation 
of bonded laborers so as to prevent their becoming bonded again. Vigilance 
committees with representatives of the state, the affected community, social 
workers, rural development institutions, and credit institutions are to assist the 
executive in this, while also defending suits against freed bonded laborers. Where 
the committee or laborer asserts the existence of a debt, bonded labor is presumed 
and the creditor has to prove otherwise. 
The next two statutes that I discuss, the CLRAA and the ISMWA, deal with 
contract labor and migrant labor respectively. One could map all three labor forms 
along a choice-coercion spectrum, with bonded labor at one end, ostensibly “free” 
labor at the other with contract labor and migrant labor falling somewhere in 
between. Indeed, the interpretive materials surrounding the laws do not draw out 
differences between these labor forms too sharply. Especially salient is the role of 
intermediaries in all three labor forms confirming the insights of Indian historians 
that in the Indian context, “the key opposition is not clearly between capital and 
labour; rather the line is once again blurred by the use of intermediaries.”159 The 
influence of intermediaries has historically been evident even within the 
supposedly formal labor sector, where laborers were recruited through caste or 
village ties, managed by jobbers, subject to debt-bondage and paid only nominally 
in cash, “thus in many ways replicating the features of agrestic servitude rather 
than a labour market.”160 This persistent role of intermediaries may well explain 
the pragmatic imposition of obligations on them rather than their criminalization 
under the statutes I am about to consider. 
The CLRAA originally passed in 1970 and amended in 1986 seeks to ensure 
that formal sector employers do not evade their obligations to their regular 
workforce by routinely employing contract laborers for short periods of time, 
making them ineligible for benefits under labor laws.161 Although the legislation 
targets labor practices in the formal sector, courts have very much viewed the 
CLRAA as a social legislation for the welfare of laborers. Empirical studies of 
contract labor further suggest high levels of informality with the largest proportion 
of contract laborers working in the construction industry where contractors 
themselves are small operators and are not conversant with the requirements of 
 
159. Peter Robb, Introduction to DALIT MOVEMENTS AND THE MEANINGS OF LABOUR IN 
INDIA, supra note 155, at 1, 17. 
160. Id. at 61. 
161. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, No. 37 of 1970, INDIA CODE 
(1986).   
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the CLRAA.162 The government can, under the CLRAA, prohibit contract labor 
by assessing the working conditions of contract laborers, their indispensability, 
and whether regular workmen cannot take their place in the production process. 
Where abolition is warranted, a contract laborer becomes a regular employee.163 
Recognizing, however, that pending the abolition of contract labor, minimum 
working conditions need to be ensured, the CLRAA imposes obligations on 
recruiters of contract laborers and intermediaries in the employer-employee 
relationship. Only registered principal employers and contractors can employ 
contract labor. A contractor in turn could be a mere recruiter or subcontractor 
rather than involved in the production process. Contractors are responsible for 
ensuring proper working conditions (such as canteens, drinking water, latrines and 
urinals, and first aid) with a backstop to the principal employer. They must 
promptly pay full wages in the presence of the principal employer’s representative. 
Central and state level advisory boards and inspectors enforce the law, which 
penalizes offending parties. Despite these enforcement mechanisms, however, the 
CLRAA has proved ineffective against recruiters.164 
The statement of objects and reasons of the ISMWA notes that in several 
Indian states, contractors or agents called sardars or khatadars recruited laborers for 
out-of-state work in large construction projects. The worker was taken to a far-off 
place on payment of railway fare only and worked seven days per week without 
fixed hours under extremely poor conditions. Agents promised, but eventually 
reneged on, the monthly settlement of piece-rate wages. Given the inadequacy of 
the CLRAA to deal with such abuse, the ISMWA was passed to protect the 
interests of this illiterate and unorganized migrant labor force. 
The ISMWA applies to any establishment or contractor who employs five or 
more interstate migrant workers (ISMW) and therefore covers even small 
operations.165 A “contractor” could be an independent contractor, agent, or 
employee, who undertakes to produce a given result for an establishment by 
employing or supplying workmen, and includes a subcontractor, a sardar, or 
khatadar. The Indian Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India held 
that even workmen recruited through “old hands” would be ISMW as the “old 
hands” were the recruiters’ agents.166 The ISMWA is similar to the CLRAA in 
many respects. Both principal employers and contractors must be registered, the 
latter needing to be registered with both home and host governments without 
which they cannot employ an ISMW. The issuing authority can build into the 
license conditions relating to the provision of appropriate wages, hours of work, 
 
162. Bagaram Tulpule, ILO Initiative on Contract Labour, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Aug. 30, 1997, 
at L-21, L-22. 
163. Sec’y, Haryana State Elec. Bd. v. Suresh, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1160, 1165–66 (India). 
164. Tulpule, supra note 162, at L-22. 
165. The Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of 
Service) Act, 1979, No. 30 of 1979, INDIA CODE.  
166. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67, 67 (India). 
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and essential amenities. Contractors are required to issue to the ISMW a passbook 
with a photo and contractual terms in a language that he understands. Contractors 
are required to pay minimum wages on time and in the presence of the principal 
employer’s representative. ISMW are also entitled to a displacement and round-
trip journey allowance, suitable conditions of work, housing, medical facilities, and 
protective clothing as well as the labor law protections of the host state. Where 
these requisite payments are not made or facilities not provided under the 
ISMWA, the principal employer is liable for these. Upon the job’s completion, the 
contractor must issue a statement that all wages and money for the return journey 
have been paid. No loan to the worker is to be outstanding or else it will now be 
extinguished. Inspectors are appointed to enforce the ISMWA, but workers can 
submit disputes to their home states to be passed on to an authority appointed 
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 
The Indian Supreme Court interpreted the three legislations in landmark 
judgments issued by activist judges at the height of the public interest litigation 
movement of the 1980s. In at least two of the cases, the state undertook large-
scale projects, which were operationalized by private party contractors who, in 
turn, employed subcontractors to recruit workers for these projects. In PUDR v. 
Union of India,167 also referred to as the Asiad Games case, the government was 
engaged in numerous construction projects in preparation for hosting the Games 
in 1982. They hired contractors who in turn hired jamadars/subcontractors. These 
subcontractors brought workers from other parts of the country and paid them 
less than the minimum wage after deducting a commission for themselves from 
the payment due to the workers. Their working conditions did not conform to the 
requirements under labor laws either. Critical for our purposes is the elaboration 
that the Supreme Court offered on Article 23 of the Constitution, which prohibits 
“begar and other similar forms of forced labour.”168 Viewing bonded labor and 
forced labor as a relic of a feudal, exploitative society that was exacerbated by two 
centuries of foreign rule, Justice Bhagwati denounced them as “totally 
incompatible with the new egalitarian socio-economic order which ‘We the people 
of India’ were determined to build . . . .”169 
In the process of clarifying the parameters of force in the context of forced 
labor, the Court specifically pointed to the low relevance of the freedom of 
contract in a country like India: 
[W]here there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no 
equality of bargaining power, a contract of service may appear on its face 
voluntary but it may, in reality, be involuntary, because while entering 
into the contract, the employee, by reason of his economically helpless 
 
167. People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473, 1473 
(India). 
168. INDIA CONST. art. 23. 
169. People’s Union for Democratic Rights, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. at 1486. 
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condition, may have been faced with Hobson’s choice, either to starve or 
to submit to the exploitative terms dictated by the powerful employer.170 
Elaborating on what constituted force, Justice Bhagwati further observed: 
‘[F]orced labour’ may arise in several ways. It may be physical force . . . or 
it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for 
imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails to provide labour or 
service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, 
want and destitution. Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives 
and compels him to adopt one particular course of action may properly be regarded as 
‘force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such ‘force’, it would be ‘forced 
labour’. Where a person is suffering from hunger or starvation, when he 
has no resources at all to fight disease or to feed his wife and children or 
even to hide their nakedness, where utter grinding poverty has broken his 
back. . . and where no other employment is available to alleviate the 
rigour of his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept any work 
that comes his way, even if the remuneration offered to him is less than 
the minimum wage. . . . And in doing so he would be acting not as a free 
agent with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of 
economic circumstances and the labour or service provided by him 
would be clearly ‘forced labour’. There is no reason why the word 
‘forced’ should be read in a narrow and restricted manner so as to be 
confined only to physical or legal ‘force’. . . .171 
Under the circumstances, the court held that any labor remunerated at a level 
less than the minimum wage would be considered to be forced labor under Article 
23 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court’s rejection of the contractarian 
argument was reinforced in another case involving the ISMWA,172 where the 
federal government argued that the large number of migrant workmen who were 
recruited by contractors to work on a major state-sponsored hydroelectric project 
were not migrant workmen under the ISMWA because they had come to work 
voluntarily. Further, in the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha, the Supreme Court held 
that given that it was likely for a forced laborer to have received an advance on his 
earnings to live off, “whenever it is shown that a labourer is made to provide 
forced labour, the Court would raise a presumption that he is required to do so in 
consideration of an advance . . . and he is therefore a bonded labourer.”173 In 
response to these Supreme Court decisions, the Indian Parliament passed an 
amendment to the BLSAA in 1985 declaring that where any contract laborer or 
ISMW worked in a system of forced labor under the conditions listed in Section 
2(g)(v) (which includes being paid below the minimum wage), it would amount to 
bonded labor. 
 
170. Id. at 1489. 
171. Id. at 1490 (emphasis added). 
172. Labourers Working on Salal Hydroelectric Project v. Jammu and Kashmir, (1983) 2 
S.C.C. 181, 186–88 (India). 
173. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67, 78 (India). 
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I consider the three Indian statutes detailed above as a version of domestic 
anti-trafficking law. Interpretive materials surrounding the statutes describe 
conditions in labor markets where laborers were routinely recruited and often 
transported under false promises to distant places within the country for purposes 
of work-related exploitation—in other words, trafficking. The term “trafficking” is 
however not mentioned in these statutes, affirming the historical association of 
the concept with prostitution. This iteration of anti-trafficking law is instructive 
for the contemporary trafficking debates on several counts. First, it construes 
force not merely in terms of physical and legal force but in structural terms, that 
is, background economic conditions including of poverty, in other words, “weak 
coercion.” The court also decisively denounced on normative grounds any labor 
that is paid less than the minimum wage, targeting “weak exploitation” among 
other things. Further, in line with the court’s cognizance of the rampant social 
practice (affirmed by a fact-finding inquiry commissioned by the court) of the 
payment of advances to vulnerable laborers, the Court presumed a relation of debt 
bondage, unseating the common understanding of bonded labor as only involving 
intergenerational bondage. 
Legal relations under all three statutes are triggered by contractual 
agreements between the contractor and laborers. This is true even of the BLSAA, 
which provides both for customary intergenerational bonded labor where the 
caste system effectively “traffics” laborers as well as for contractual arrangements 
that result in bonded labor. The CLRAA and ISMWA make no mention of the 
means of recruitment into exploitative working conditions, while the BLSAA lists 
certain social customs as involving force per se. There is instead an assumption 
that the means necessarily involve high levels of economic and social compulsion, 
which is only reinforced by the Indian Supreme Court, whose conception of force 
goes beyond physical and legal force to cover even background conditions of 
poverty. Economic vulnerability, ignorance, and poverty all become indicators that 
the recruitment for migration was indeed coerced. We find here an expression of 
what Article 3(a) of the U.N. Protocol lists as the “abuse of a position of 
vulnerability.” Recollect that the travaux préparatoires174 defines this as “any 
situation in which the person involved has no real and acceptable alternative but 
to submit to the abuse involved.”175 
The determinative factor then is whether the recruitment results in 
exploitation. Section 2(g)(v) of the BLSAA sets an objective threshold for such 
exploitation including the payment of anything less than the minimum wage. 
Where working conditions are poor, irrespective of the means of recruitment, 
intermediaries, namely the recruiters and contractors, are held liable for providing 
appropriate pay and working conditions with a backstop to the primary employer. 
 
174. Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, supra note 53. 
175. Gallagher, supra note 38, at 986 n.71 (citing Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 53, ¶ 63). 
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Thus, instead of being bogged down by apparently bright-line concepts like force 
and coercion, the BLSAA, CLRAA, and ISMWA concentrate on the labor 
conditions that avail at the other end. Thus, the means of trafficking are 
deemphasized and the purpose of trafficking, namely, exploitation, privileged. 
Unlike the IPC’s new anti-trafficking provisions, the CLRAA and ISMWA seek to 
ameliorate such working conditions by imposing obligations on the intermediaries, 
especially the recruiters who supplied these laborers to the principal employers. 
Apart from these interpretations of the means and purposes of trafficking, the 
statutes that I have discussed also deploy a combination of criminal law and labor 
law mechanisms to target trafficking instead of solely relying on criminal law, 
which is a fraught option considering the abuse-generating role of the Indian 
police. 
C. Potential Objections to a Critique of Anti-Trafficking Law 
Four objections are possible to my analysis of Indian anti-trafficking law. 
These pertain to (a) the transportability of a domestic legal model to cross-border 
trafficking; (b) the arguably unique nature of Indian labor conditions; (c) whether 
an emphasis on exploitation might not further entrench a politics of abolition; and 
(d) whether rendering visible the exploitation of men might not obscure the 
specific harms that women suffer in the course of migration. 
The first line of critique relates to whether obligations of the kind envisaged 
by Indian labor laws could be easily imposed on intermediaries in the international 
setting. The significance of intermediaries in cross-border migration suggests that 
the Indian law on interstate migration can offer a viable model. Indeed, for 
countries whose citizens migrate outwards in substantial numbers like the 
Philippines or Sri Lanka, regulating intermediaries such as employment recruiters 
under domestic law is a fairly standard legal strategy. States of origin also typically 
require certification and skills training, the signing of written contracts, and 
consular support in the host state. Indeed, even India passed the Emigration Act 
in 1983, which prohibits the emigration of Indian citizens for work abroad unless 
they obtain emigration clearance, which can be refused where the terms and 
conditions of employment are discriminatory or exploitative, where working and 
living conditions are substandard, or where the work is against Indian law, public 
policy, or human dignity and decency. Recruiters and employers are sought to be 
regulated. Drawing on the ISMWA, one might go further to hold intermediaries 
liable for the employer’s obligations with a backstop to the employer. This might 
include mandating employers in the host state to pay minimum wages. However, 
protective measures can end up having perverse consequences in that the number 
of jobs available in the host state might reduce as a result.176 More generally, as the 
 
176. See DAVID MCKENZIE ET AL., DISTORTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT 
LABOR MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM FILIPINO MIGRATION AND WAGE RESPONSES TO 
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work of Rhacel Parreñas on Filipina migrant hostesses in Japan demonstrates, an 
elaborate labyrinth of obligations imposed both in the Philippines and in Japan on 
recruiters, agencies, and employers has only resulted in hostesses being 
indentured. Her work also illustrates that these labor sectors are quite sensitive to 
any regulatory changes. Thus, when the Japanese government introduced more 
stringent requirements for entertainer visas,177 ostensibly to professionalize 
hostessing by increasing the training period (but really to improve its Tier 2 Watch 
List categorization in the TIP rankings), the numbers of Filipina migrant hostesses 
fell from eighty thousand in 2004 to eight thousand in 2005.178 This translated into 
more debt for the migrant workers, increasing their conditions of trafficking.179 If, 
on the other hand, one were to reduce their qualifications to reduce debt levels 
amongst Filipina hostesses through their reduced dependency on talent 
managers,180 the resultant increased supply of hostesses may well lower wages in 
the host state. Still, an assessment of such unintended consequences should not 
dissuade us from improving the bargaining power of workers. 
Some may object that Indian anti-trafficking law addresses the peculiar 
conditions of Indian labor. This may explain the anecdotal reports from 
negotiators of the U.N. Protocol of India’s resistance to anti-trafficking law given 
national embarrassment over the problem of bonded labor. While these claims as 
to the exceptionalism of Indian labor conditions continue to be the matter of 
much debate amongst postcolonial scholars, the category of the free wage laborer 
has unraveled in the West with significant transformations in the political 
economy and the rise of the precariat,181 suggesting that the free wage laborer was 
probably always somewhat of a mythical figure. Also, while intergenerational 
bonded labor may appear unique to South Asia, recent sociologies of bonded 
labor map the rise of neo-bondage involving seasonal migrant labor where entry is 
not due to deception.182 Arranged through jobbers and contractors, laborers here 
are tied in through loans/advances prior to the start of employment,183 are paid 
minimal allowances during employment, with overall payment being settled at the 
end, which may leave the laborer in debt, to be repaid through next year’s seasonal 
work. 
 
DESTINATION COUNTRY ECONOMIC SHOCKS 26 (2012), available at http://www.cream 
-migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_09_12.pdf. 
177. Parreñas, supra note 116, at 172–73. 
178. Id. at 147. 
179. Id. at 173. 
180. Id. at 177. 
181. GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 27 (2011). 
182. See, e.g., Jens Lerche, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour? Unfree Labour, Neo-liberal 
Globalization, and the International Labour Organization, in INDIA’S UNFREE WORKFORCE: OF BONDAGE 
OLD AND NEW 352, 368 (Jan Breman et al. eds., 2009); see also INT’L LABOUR ORG., BURIED IN 
BRICKS: A RAPID ASSESSMENT OF BONDED LABOUR IN BRICK KILNS IN AFGHANISTAN 34 (2011), 
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_172671.pdf (providing a similar analysis in another South Asian context); KARA, supra note 43, at 28. 
183. Lerche, supra note 182, at 367. 
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A more substantive objection to my analysis is that by rendering visible the 
endemic nature of coercion, it opens itself up to an abolitionist agenda with its 
favored solutions of rescue and rehabilitation. Indeed, MacKinnon inaugurated 
the radical feminist project thirty years ago when she claimed, in the context of 
rape, that where force and desire were not mutually exclusive, it was debatable 
whether consent was a meaningful concept.184 Despite these beginnings, radical 
feminists are today content with pursuing simplistic strategies of rescue and 
rehabilitation in anti-trafficking initiatives. Notably, however, the Indian Supreme 
Court has expressed ambivalence about the rehabilitation of bonded laborers. In 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,185 99% of the laborers found by an NGO 
to be working in stone quarries in the state of Haryana were from various parts of 
India. They were working under unsafe working conditions and living in 
inhumane conditions without shelter, food, or clean drinking water. A large 
number of them were bonded laborers. The court noted that where rehabilitation 
was not forthcoming, improved conditions of labor might be preferable at the 
current site of work. It observed: 
We may point out that the problem of bonded labourers is a difficult 
problem because unless, on being freed from bondage, they are provided 
proper and adequate rehabilitation, it would not help to merely secure 
their release. Rather in such cases it would be more in their interest to 
ensure proper working conditions with full enjoyment of the benefits of 
social welfare and labour laws so that they can live a healthy decent life. 
But of course this would only be the next best substitute for release and 
rehabilitation which must receive the highest priority.186 
Even setting aside the lack of political commitment on the part of the Indian 
state to eradicating bonded labor,187 bonded laborers themselves are known to 
mock the rescue efforts of NGOs188 who erroneously assume that bondage was 
imposed through “extra-economic coercion,” namely, trickery. Some laborers 
prefer not to be released since they have no alternative.189 In countries like Nepal, 
bonded laborers who had been freed often slipped back into debt bondage given 
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the lack of access to credit or sufficient income for survival, with evidence to 
suggest that they were worse off than before their rescue.190 This suggests that 
closer attention should be paid to the politics of abolitionism, and that there is a 
need to formulate a robust, redistributive agenda focused on workers’ rights, 
instead of relying on victim rhetoric, weak rescue, and rehabilitation schemes. This 
is a theme that is increasingly becoming salient as trafficked victims who have 
benefited from anti-trafficking laws such as the VTVPA find that they are 
increasingly prone not just to “unsafe and dangerous working conditions but also 
to reexploitation.”191 Hence the call for a “realignment of our solutions from one 
of ‘rescue’ to one of ‘harm reduction.’”192 
Finally, if contemporary anti-trafficking discourse was to be reoriented 
towards grasping the exploitation of both men and women in labor sectors other 
than sex work, we could be at risk of ignoring the gendered harms of migration 
and trafficked labor. After all, migration outcomes for women and men can differ 
starkly. The sexual harassment of migrant women and the codes of honor in the 
community they migrate from can often mean that they can never really return 
“home.” Josmina’s suicide upon finding out that she is pregnant is an example. 
Indeed, feminist scholars have problematized the distinction between “labor 
trafficking” and “sex trafficking” in this context.193 Interestingly, the sole 
amendment recently proposed to the ISMWA seeks to make the law gender-
neutral so that it can be made applicable to migrant women and children.194 While 
the critique in relation to the invisibility of gender is essential, I argue that 
gendered harm is today hyper-visible, which in turn can produce regressive 
outcomes for women.195 To illustrate, the Indian National Commission for 
Women recently suggested that the ISMWA be amended to allow for a family 
member to accompany a female migrant at the employer’s expense. In fact, even 
what appears to be an unequivocal sexual harm may reveal gains for women. For 
example, in Blanchet’s study of Bangladeshi women who migrated for domestic 
work or for bar dancing, and resorted to sex work, women in fact found that they 
experienced greater control over working conditions, obtained higher pay, felt 
valued, enjoyed male attention,196 and even found pleasure in sex work.197 Yet, 
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other women found that the reversal of gender roles, with the husband 
performing household chores and bringing up the children while the wife earned 
outside the home,198 enabled them to question their husbands’ authority. Thus, a 
reduced focus on the gendered harms of migration may in fact render visible the 
benefits of female migration. 
D. De-Exceptionalizing Sex Work; Theorizing Exploitation 
In the previous section, I de-exceptionalized trafficking and its routine 
conflation with trafficking for sex work by offering an insight into a legal regime 
that deals with the trafficking of both men and women into sectors other than sex 
work. In this section, I draw on a specific ethnographic account of two Indian sex 
markets to de-exceptionalize sex work as always inherently harmful in order to 
pursue a theory of exploitation within this sector. As I stated earlier, there has 
been far less discussion in the trafficking debates of the concept of exploitation 
than the coercion/consent dynamic, despite its centrality to the U.N. Protocol’s 
definition of trafficking and its mention as far back as the 1949 U.N. Convention. 
Indeed, despite extensive feminist inputs into Protocol negotiations, the definition 
of the term “exploitation” did not reflect the sophistication of either feminist or 
non-feminist theorizing on exploitation.199 This lack of attention to the term 
“exploitation” could well be because, since 1949, sex has been a key aspect of 
international legal activity directed towards exploitation200 based on the likely 
assumption that sex work is per se exploitative. Thus, the U.N. Protocol and the 
VTVPA both list the minimum standard of exploitation by reference to slavery, 
practices similar to slavery, and so on for labor markets other than sex work, but 
offer no such minimum in the case of sex work. The U.N. Protocol, therefore, 
betrays traces of the earlier legal imagination on trafficking in the context of the 
moral panics of white slavery.201 
For a de-exceptionalist account of sex work that seeks to identify exploitative 
practices within the sex sector, O’Connell Davidson cautions: 
[P]olicy debate on forced labour in the sex sector cannot be bracketed off 
from debate on the more general regulation of that sector, any more than 
the issue of “trafficking” can be treated in isolation from the more 
general phenomenon of migration. 
In the absence of debate on the specificity of sex work, the details of 
labour regulation, and the minimum standards that should be applied to 
the work of prostitutes, and on what constitutes an unacceptable level of 
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“exploitation” within prostitution . . . it is dangerous to talk about forced 
prostitution and sex slaves.202 
It is precisely with a view towards identifying such exploitation within sex 
work that I reflect briefly on the political economy of two sex markets that I have 
studied in the past. More generally, in theorizing the parameters of exploitation, 
Munro suggests two important components: (1) wrongful use involving 
instrumentalization for achieving one’s ends; and (2) the disparity of value where the 
beneficiary gains disproportionately at the cost of the exploited person.203 At least 
three of the critical concepts of a theory of exploitation—instrumentalization, 
coercion, and harm—figure prominently in the feminist sex work debates. The 
radical feminist theory of sexual exploitation itself implicates all three in its 
account of women’s sexual subordination and the constitutive harm of 
commodification. Thus, it goes to the heart of the wrongful use aspect of the 
theory of exploitation. Materialist feminists on the other hand, like Marxists, are 
equally interested in the wrongful use and disparity of value involved in 
exploitation.204 Much of this feminist scholarship, however, focuses far less on the 
disparity of value at the transactional level within sex markets or the sex industry. 
Without this analysis, though, it is difficult to contextualize and measure 
exploitation, and this in turn produces generic regulatory proposals untailored to 
specific economic scenarios. Feminists who do delineate the disparity of value 
across a range of sex work transactions do so primarily in terms of the class 
processes that mediate sex work. These typically include enslavement, directly and 
indirectly employed, and self-employed or independent sex work.205 Elsewhere, I 
have sought to build on this feminist analysis by suggesting that class processes 
offer only a partial account of exploitation in the sex industry. I instead propose 
the phrase “mode of organization” to convey the range of sociocultural meanings 
that sex work assumes in its concrete institutional settings. In my study of the 
political economy of sex work in Sonagachi, a Kolkata red-light area, and Tirupati, 
described elsewhere,206 three modes of organization of sex work were featured in 
both markets. In Sonagachi, these were the chhukri system (akin to bonded labor), 
the adhiya system where the sex worker and the brothel-keeper split half the 
income per sex work transaction (less costs payable to an agent, if any) and finally, 
the self-employed mode. In Tirupati, on the other hand, sex workers 
predominantly worked in the contractor mode or the self-employed mode. Rarely 
did I hear of debt bondage there in recent years. 
In addition to the mode of organization, the institutional setting in which sex 
work is performed (e.g., the household, brothel, street, hospitality economy) is 
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critical for assessing whether a sex worker is exploited. For one, the range of 
internal and external stakeholders and the relational dynamics amongst them differ 
dramatically in varied institutional settings. Other factors that determine the extent 
of exploitation include the spatial concentration of sex work businesses and the 
scale of the sex business, although in both Sonagachi and Tirupati the scale of the 
sex business tended to be small. In other words, when compared to a sauna 
establishment in the Philippines, which has between sixty and five hundred 
employees,207 or a massage parlor in Bangkok with an average of under a hundred 
employees,208 even large brothels in Sonagachi do not approach the lower end of 
that number. 
The self-employed mode of organization was evident in several institutional 
settings where I studied sex work. This does not mean that these sex workers are 
not exploited, only that the disparity in value when compared to sex workers in 
the other two modes is lower, and that the sex workers themselves are notionally 
in charge of the rate of exploitation. Similarly, the chhukri mode in Sonagachi 
involves debt bondage and is, therefore, a “practice similar to slavery” in U.N. 
Protocol terms. It does not, however, amount to slavery given sex workers’ 
mobility, especially compared to other modes within the sex industry.209 If one 
were to consider the intermediate category of relations between slavery-like 
practices and self-employed sex work, things get complicated. The terms used to 
identify the intermediate class process—direct or indirect employment, enterprise 
labor, the contractor mode, and the capitalist class process—do not translate easily 
in the sex markets I studied. Instead, the boundaries between unfree labor, self-
employment, and wage labor were not absolute210 and may well have harbored 
intermediate forms between wage labor and bonded labor.211 
This leads me to conclude that an overarching theory of exploitation in sex 
work is not possible given the heterogeneity of sex markets and the varied modes 
of organization that mediate it.212 How then may one detect, measure, and 
respond to exploitation appropriately? Exploitation could be measured in terms of 
the three alternate situations to being exploited. According to Wilkinson,213 these 
include (1) the pre-interactive baseline (the outcome had the parties to the 
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transaction never met); (2) the closest possible world baseline (the outcome had 
the exploited person entered into the same kind of transaction with someone 
other than the exploiter); and (3) the normative baseline (the outcome that is 
normatively desired for the exploited person). Doing sex work will invariably put 
the sex worker above the pre-interactive baseline whether she resorts to it out of 
dire poverty or “dull economic compulsion.”214 This is because the remuneration 
in sex work is often a high multiple of the income from traditionally female 
sectors of employment. This is a baseline that feminists would rightly argue 
justifies the status quo, and therefore, is not one on which to base redistributive 
efforts. Feminists, meanwhile, vehemently disagree over the normative baseline, as 
some would seek to abolish sex work altogether while other pro-sex work 
advocates would probably conform to the legal baseline of the U.N. Protocol and 
work towards abolishing chhukri as a form of trafficking. However, a pro-sex work 
feminist view of sex work might desire an expanded notion of exploitation. In this 
case, feminists may endeavor to improve the closest possible world baseline for all 
sex workers by ensuring that sex workers work under safe working conditions, as 
well as produce, appropriate, and distribute as much of the surplus from sex work 
amongst themselves as possible rather than to other stakeholders in the business. 
For this, some basic understanding of the political economy of sex markets is 
necessary, as is an appreciation of the unintended consequences of any form of 
regulatory intervention, even if ostensibly beneficial. 
E. Community-Based Anti-Trafficking Initiatives :  
The Case of Self-Regulatory Boards in Sonagachi 
A significant challenge for the future success of reformulating anti-trafficking 
law lies in its implementation. As it is, even ten years since the adoption of the 
U.N. Protocol, the UNODC has reported on the abysmally low conviction rates 
for the offense of trafficking.215 I have argued, so far, that labor law is preferable 
to criminal law in targeting trafficking.216 The ILO, in fact, notes that the labor 
machinery increasingly has a more significant role to play in implementing anti-
trafficking law217 and recognizes the role of social partners such as employers and 
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workers in combating forced labor and trafficking.218 Indeed, trade unions have 
played a major role in countries like Australia in identifying exploitative labor 
practices.219 Further, workers’ representatives were forceful in their recent call to 
the ILO to supplement the Convention on Forced Labour through standard 
setting with a view to targeting trafficking. In the Indian context, however, where 
85% of the Indian working population is in the informal economy, conventional 
forms of trade union mobilization are not necessarily effective. Even substantively 
speaking, Indian labor laws geared towards the informal economy tend to have 
been initiated by provincial state legislatures, and emphasize wages, social security, 
and welfare for workers rather than, say, industrial relations, which is a 
preoccupation of conventional labor laws. 
It is in the context of localized sector-specific labor law reform on the one 
hand, and the failure of the state to enforce laws relating to bonded, contract, and 
migrant labor on the other, that attempts at self-regulation by workers assume 
significance. Interestingly, in the case of sex workers, it is the very lack of the 
recognition of sex work as a form of legitimate labor by the state, and the uneven 
enforcement of the ITPA, that has produced a regulatory vacuum within which 
novel attempts at self-regulation have taken root. I use the example of the self-
regulatory boards that the Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee (DMSC), an 
organization of sixty thousand sex workers in the Indian state of West Bengal, 
have set up to combat the trafficking of women and girls into Sonagachi. The role 
of sex workers in anti-trafficking initiatives is counterintuitive,220 and is indeed 
thought to extend the anti-trafficking agenda of the state through local 
surveillance.221 Yet it warrants attention especially as governments are being called 
upon to treat migrants not as victims or objects of government policies but as 
partners in the formulation of relevant anti-trafficking policies and in finding an 
alternative to slavery.222 Note here that anti-trafficking initiatives in relation to sex 
workers in India are typically initiated by American Christian groups like IJM, 
which undertake stealth raids in red-light areas to rescue and rehabilitate sex 
workers. An extensive critique of such initiatives, which have been largely 
ineffective, has emerged over the years.223 
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DMSC has worked in Sonagachi for over fifteen years having initially 
emerged from a highly successful HIV prevention project. DMSC has undertaken 
welfare activities for its members ranging from providing health care and 
education to sex workers and their children, to managing a credit cooperative, and 
to actively lobbying the state and federal government to repeal the extant anti-sex 
work criminal law, the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1986, and recognize sex 
work as legitimate work. In consonance with its aspirations to self-regulation, 
perhaps as a nod to the high visibility of trafficking as an international policy 
issue,224 and as a move towards securing its own legitimacy as a sex workers’ 
group, DMSC has set up self-regulatory boards (SRBs) in most of the red-light 
areas that it works in. As of 2006, SRBs were operational in twenty-seven red-light 
areas of Kolkata alone. The driving principles of this effort were opposition to the 
buying and selling of girls/women, tricking them into sex work, forced 
prostitution, and child prostitution, and the desire to treat women who wanted to 
do sex work with respect. Consequently, trafficked, forced, and minor sex workers 
were sent back to their families or provided with vocational training for alternate 
means of employment, although their families often played a major role in their 
trafficking. By the same token, sex workers who were found not to have been 
trafficked were counseled about what to expect in sex work, typical rules of 
brothels, the health hazards involved in sex work, the need to practice safe sex, 
and the harassment that a sex worker might expect from the police, local 
hooligans, and customers. The SRB mechanism largely depends on its locality for 
its effectiveness. Once a victim is spotted in a red-light area, an emergency 
meeting of the SRB is called where board members extensively interview the girl 
or woman to ascertain the circumstances leading to her taking up sex work. 
The SRBs are anchored in the sex worker community. Sex workers account 
for 60% of the SRBs’ membership (including sex workers in the community as 
well as DMSC peer educators and supervisors), while 40% of its members are 
drawn from local government and include experts such as a local lawyer, doctor, 
and social worker. At the state level, the steering committee of the SRBs oversees 
the activities of SRBs in the red-light areas and includes, in addition to 
representatives of local SRBs, a representative from the State Women’s 
Commission, the State Human Rights Commission, and the Labor Commission. 
The authority of the SRB is coalesced through the holding of monthly meetings, 
and maintenance of records of its proceedings—monthly records of the number 
of trafficked cases for each SRB, case histories of trafficked girls and women, and 
handover papers in case the trafficked person chooses to stay in a government 
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home. Apart from dealing with trafficked sex workers, the SRBs also have a social 
welfare function, which ensures their acceptance in the community. 
DMSC hopes that SRBs will regulate conditions within the sex industry in 
the future. They claim sex workers are on par with professionals like doctors and 
lawyers who self-regulate through the Indian Medical Association and the Bar 
Council of India, respectively. This claim to expertise is particularly resonant in the 
case of the SRBs’ anti-trafficking mandate, for it is the resident sex workers in a 
red-light area who are most likely to know of new entrants to the business.225 
SRBs formulate norms of self-governance to reflect sex workers’ experiences. For 
an SRB, only a sex worker who is compelled into sex work by another person is 
trafficked, not a woman entering it out of force of circumstance. Similarly, DMSC 
claims that sex workers empathize with trafficked women and girls such that they 
will go to any lengths to prevent a trafficked sex worker from being apprehended 
by the police and sent to a state home where she will be subject to physical and 
sexual abuse. Also, when there is a difference of opinion (say as to the age of the 
trafficked person) within the Board, a sex worker’s opinion is considered to be 
more valuable due to her experience in the industry. 
Support for SRBs in the red-light areas has come slowly. Predictably, brothel 
keepers were initially against the idea, believing that DMSC passed on information 
about trafficked sex workers and minors to the police, thereby instigating raids. 
They also suspected DMSC of trying to abolish sex work altogether. However, 
over the years, given that trafficking is one of the few reasons for police raids at 
least in Sonagachi,226 DMSC claims that brothel-keepers have, in their own 
interest, refrained from trafficking sex workers. Landlords also put pressure on 
brothel-keepers who harbored minors or trafficked women for fear of arrest and 
prosecution. Brothel keepers worry that their competitors may tip off the SRB.227 
Thus, it is clear that the state’s enforcement practices, in combination with 
community-based mechanisms, can shift social norms within sex markets fairly 
significantly. Threats of police involvement and legal interventions are highly 
persuasive in community-based anti-trafficking efforts.228 Given the local 
anchoring of the SRB in a red-light area, traffickers are also sometimes 
apprehended by sex workers in the community. When quizzed about the 
possibility of maintaining a trafficker database and other forms of public shaming 
which are currently in vogue, the DMSC peer educator I spoke to confirmed that 
this was not necessary because traffickers often panic when apprehended by 
DMSC and beg to be pardoned. This suggests that traffickers are not part of an 
organized crime network, but rather, operate on an individual basis. 
Any assessment of the SRB mechanism initiated by DMSC partly depends 
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on what preceded it. Earlier, police raids in red-light areas were instigated by the 
need to locate minors in sex work. The police would typically send away the 
better-looking sex workers to corrective institutions under the ITPA whether they 
were minors or not. There, women were tortured and sexually harassed to provide 
sexual favors for personnel.229 Brothel-keepers and agents would pose as relatives 
and pay bribes to secure their release, which was used to further indebt the sex 
worker to the brothel. The remaining women, who sought to assist with their 
trafficker’s prosecution, were often threatened by the police with physical violence 
if they did not reveal the trafficker’s identity.230 Moreover, women feared the 
police, for if they were to repatriate the woman to her village or hometown, her 
trafficked status would become public knowledge for which she would be 
ostracized. Police raids earlier also reduced the customer footfall in red light areas 
and undermined HIV prevention efforts by pushing sex workers desperate for 
income to engage in risky sexual practices. It is for these reasons that DMSC 
continues to be highly hesitant to hand over trafficked women and girls to the 
police. Thus, it is plausible that SRBs, in preventing the trafficking of minor and 
forced sex workers, are minimizing the incidence of police raids, and are hence 
having an impact in their respective red-light areas. 
DMSC is keen to register the SRBs and its steering committee with the state 
and set up its own rehabilitation/short stay home to step up its anti-trafficking 
efforts, rather than submit to the unpredictable outcomes of a police-driven 
process. Yet, on a day-to-day basis, the police are respectful and sometimes even 
direct sex workers to approach their local SRB first with their dispute. Similarly, 
some state officials have expressed support for this highly efficient, low cost 
method of stepping up anti-trafficking efforts. International organizations such as 
the UNDP and Action Aid have aided this innovative method of anti-trafficking. 
When evaluating the potential for success of DMSC’s anti-trafficking efforts, 
we need to bear in mind the limited resources at their disposal. Monetary 
resources are obvious impediments that affect the repatriation of victims from 
both within India and neighboring countries. The other inbuilt limitation of SRBs 
is that they are likely to be more effective in spatially concentrated sex markets 
such as red-light areas, rather than the dispersed sex markets found in Southern 
India. Even in red-light areas, some boards are more effective than others. In a 
highly differentiated market like Sonagachi, DMSC has faced obstacles to its SRBs 
from high-end brothels in affluent parts of Sonagachi where brothel-keepers 
routinely groom young girls to do sex work, paying little attention to DMSC, 
which is viewed as representing poorer sex workers. Also, despite the claim that 
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DMSC controls Sonagachi,231 in reality, they are not always able to counter the 
deep-rooted nexus between the local clubs, political parties, agents, brothel 
keepers, and hooligans. 
Moreover, DMSC is an organization that is run by sex workers, some of who 
maintain sex workers on an adhiya basis (where income is split between the brothel 
keeper and the sex worker).232 Hence, it is not surprising that these institutions of 
self-governance reflect the logic of the market. To illustrate, DMSC had rescued a 
trafficked minor from a brothel in Sonagachi who was sent home to her family. A 
few years later, the brothel-keeper approached DMSC seeking permission to re-
employ the same girl, who was no longer a minor, under pressure from her 
parents who needed her income. DMSC has thus found itself in the position of a 
gate-keeper to the industry. It has responded to such requests so far on an ad-hoc 
basis.233 On the other hand, SRBs’ zero tolerance for child prostitution in the red-
light area could be viewed as reflecting sex workers’ opposition to competition 
from younger sex workers. In conclusion, while the effectiveness of the SRB 
mechanism is yet to be determined, it would be premature to dismiss it out of 
hand as a front for traffickers. This is especially true because an anti-trafficking 
strategy that is deeply familiar with the local dynamics of a labor market and that 
selectively uses the force of state law to shift norms within the market is more 
likely to be successful. Perhaps, as the Network of Sex Work Projects reminds us: 
“Sex workers: [are] part of the solution.”234 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of human trafficking has received unprecedented attention in 
recent years. As images of modern day slavery proliferate the news media at a 
rapid pace, repeatedly inscribing the typical trafficking episode in the popular 
consciousness, states and civil society organizations have been hard at work in 
pushing international law to take notice. Feminists in particular succeeded in this 
respect when the U.N. General Assembly adopted the U.N. Protocol in 2000. 
Feminists have, however, become victims of our own success. Over the past 
decade, powerful Western states invested in a project of border control have acted 
along with a conservative U.S. administration interested in opposing prostitution 
worldwide to crack down on a very selective form of trafficking, namely, 
trafficking for sex work. The use of a prohibitionist international law, or what 
Kristof calls the big-stick approach,235 to target a highly complex and fluid 
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phenomenon like trafficking, which is itself embedded in global flows of migrants, 
refugees, and women in search of better life prospects, has produced significant 
negative human rights externalities on the ground. The benefits of the anti-
trafficking regime for trafficked persons are not clear either. Moreover, prospects 
for discussing these deleterious effects, much less taking action to stem them, 
appear low given that abolitionist rhetoric is backed by powerful political actors 
and funding sanctions, and because there is a lack of mechanisms to objectively 
assess the evidence as to the effects of these initiatives.236 Thus, although the 
increased state attention to contemporary forms of exploitation is “reason for 
reflection, not rejection or denial,”237 it is an inescapable fact that despite our best 
efforts, the U.N. Protocol and most of the domestic legal initiatives following 
from it have been hostage to both ideological as well as institutional priorities, few 
of which reflect the interests of women. 
The central predicament now facing us is whether we should work towards 
reforming the U.N. Protocol framework, or if we are better off training our 
energies elsewhere, say for instance, towards international labor law mechanisms? 
The response to the U.N. Protocol after all has been tremendous according to 
human rights activists like Gallagher who have justified its benefits238 despite its 
drawbacks.239 Gallagher insists that the U.N. Protocol is only the first step in the 
development of “a comprehensive international legal framework comprising 
regional treaties, abundant interpretive guidance, a range of policy instruments and 
a canon of state practice.”240 While it is debatable whether this emerging body of 
anti-trafficking law demonstrates a “relatively high level of consistency with 
international standards,”241 its relatively fluid form does offer possibilities for 
intervention. It is precisely with a view to such intervention that I have elaborated 
on domestic anti-trafficking law already on the books in a developing country like 
India, with its large-scale internal migration profile. The proposed standard setting 
by the ILO to the Forced Labor Convention offers much hope in this respect. 
As domestic legal regimes consider trafficking law reform, I propose actively 
 
236. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1710. 
237. Gallagher, supra note 25, at 828. 
238. For instance, Gallagher points to the legislative attention that trafficking has garnered in 
the aftermath of the U.N. Protocol. She cites a recent UNODC report, which reports that 125 
countries in the survey had anti-trafficking legislation. Id. at 813 n.100 (citing UNITED NATIONS 
OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 22). Forty-five percent of the surveyed countries 
adopted these laws only after the U.N. Protocol entered into force in December 2003. Id. In 2003, 
only five percent of the 155 countries surveyed by UNODC had a national plan to deal with 
trafficking. By 2008, this increased to fifty-three percent. Id. at 830 n.172. Fifty-two percent of the 155 
countries had established a specialist law enforcement response to trafficking in persons. Id. at 830 
n.173. Prosecution for trafficking-related offenses however continued to remain extremely low. Id. at 
830 n.174. For a view that is less sanguine about the viability of the human rights approach to 
trafficking, see Juss, supra note 121, at 294–95 (arguing that there is nothing in the U.N. Protocol that 
guides courts on how to respond to protect victims of trafficking). 
239. Gallagher, supra note 25, at 831. 
240. Id. at 791. 
241. Id. 
          
2014] BEYOND SEXUAL HUMANITARIANISM 405 
expanding the narrow focus of current anti-trafficking efforts away from the top 
of the pyramid of anti-trafficking law, targeting scenarios involving strong 
coercion and strong exploitation, and instead pushing downwards towards the 
range of other trafficking scenarios. The momentum around trafficking issues will 
not only help re-envision international anti-trafficking law, but will also offer the 
perfect opportunity to invigorate the enforcement of domestic labor laws against 
trafficking, which have been rendered dormant with the onslaught of neoliberal 
economic reforms. There has been some concern about such an expansive 
interpretation of the definition of trafficking,242 yet it is a chance worth taking for 
purposes of locating and assessing the normative desires of anti-trafficking law. 
After all, domestic legal mediations of notions of coercion and exploitation in the 
trafficking context vary widely, as I have demonstrated in the Indian case, and 
there is no reason to constrain these unduly as the jurisprudence of anti-trafficking 
law emerges. Similarly, fostering plurality in the regulatory mechanism such that 
labor law is at the center, coupled with the highly selective use of criminal law 
penalties, informed in turn by a granular understanding of the political economy 
and legal topography of labor markets is likely to be more effective. A deeper 
understanding of the economics driving labor markets and the highly 
counterintuitive effects of legal responses to forced migration and exploitative 
working conditions in labor markets243 is crucial to developing effective anti-
trafficking law. Ultimately, the recognition of the varied stakes that developing and 
developed countries have in anti-trafficking law, and the reorientation of anti-
trafficking law away from a criminalization model to a labor model, may indeed 
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